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The Journal, in this issue, is printing articles from the national
Symposium series dealing with "Scientific Proof and Relations of
Law and Medicine" (2nd series). The Symposium contains fifty
or more studies prepared by legal and scientific writers on problems
of joint interest; it is one phase of a program directed to the cor-
relation of law and science. The papers will be published in the
pages of participating legal and medical journals during the Spring
and Summer of 1946. The intent of the effort is to muster up legal
and scientific learning relevant to various type problems which need
illumination from both sources for their proper solution. The sci-
entific writers have undertaken, under editorial direction, to pre-
pare their studies in a basic style comprehensible to lawyers, with-
out, however, any sacrifice of scientific authority.
The new Symposium is a continuation of the first series, pub-
lished by leading law reviews and medical journals in the Spring
of 1943. As before, the general Editor of the Symposium is Hu-
bert Winston Smith, (A.B., M.B.A., L.L.B., M.D.) who holds an
appointment, under the Distinguished Professorship Fund, as
Professor of Legal Medicine in the University of Illinois affiliated
with the College of Law and with the College of Medicine. At the
time of the first Symposium, Professor Smith was Research Associ-
ate on the faculties of Harvard Law School and Harvard Medical
School. Readers interested in procuring a master index containing
citations to the studies published in both the first and second series
of "Scientific Proof and Relations of Law and Medicine," may do so
by sending 20c in currency or stamps to Professor Smith, College
of Law, University of Illinois, Urbana, Illinois. Copies so reserved
will be mailed between May 15 and June 1.
THE LAW OF HOMICIDE
Relin M. Perkins
Homicide involves social behavior which commands the intense inter-
est of lawyers and medical men, of law enforcement officers and special-
ists in scientific crme detection, tosaynothingof the public at large.
It is peculiarly fitting that a Symposium series devoted to "Scientific
Proof and Relations of Law and Medicine" should feature a comprehen-
sive, yet basic, presentation of the law of homicide.
Professor Perkins has produced a monograph on the subject which
will be read with confidence and admiration by a varied audience. His
exposition is illuminated by years of scholarly research which have won
for him a position of eminence among scholars of the Criminal Law.-
EDITOR.
The author of this study has written upon all or part of the
field on two previous occasions and needed to draw upon some
of the material previously used in each. The Foundation Press,
Inc., Chicago, kindly authorized the author to reproduce here all
or any part of Chapters VII and X of Elements of Police Sci-
ence (1942). And the Yale Law Review gave similar permis-
sion with reference to the article "A Re-Examination of Malice
Aforethought," which appeared in its volume 47 at page 537
(1934). The author is deeply indebted to both publishers for
such permission.
ROLLIN M. PERKINS
A. MURDER, MANSLAUGHTER, AND NEGLIGENT
HOMICIDE
Murder is the most serious offense against the person. In-
deed, it is the greatest crime of all, unless it be treason which
threatens the very existence of the state itself. No other social
interest is more important than that of safeguarding the lives
and limbs of the individual members of the community. This
social interest has given rise to the common-law crimes of mur-
der and manslaughter, and in a few jurisdictions to an addi-
tional statutory crime of negligent homicide. All of these of-
fenses have one common element and hence it is important to
speak first of homicide.
1. HOMICIDE
Homicide is the killing of a human being by another human
being.1
The older authorities gave this definition: Homicide is the
killing of a human being by a human being.2 The difference
between the two is that suicide is excluded by the first but in-
cluded in the second. The problems of self-destruction are so
different from those involved in the killing of another that it
is desirable to use "suicide" and "homicide" as mutually ex-
clusive terms, and the modem trend is in this direction.
Killing by a Human Being. It is not homicide for a man to
kill an animal or for an animal to kill a man.3 An animal
might be used as a means of committing homicide, as if one
man on horseback should purposely run down another on foot
with fatal consequences; but in such a case the law attributes
the killing to the human rider and declares it to be homicide
for this reason. In fact, whether a certain loss of life was
brought about by a human being is a problem of fact rather
than law except as a matter of causation. By an arbitrary rule,
the law will not recognize a homicide unless the death has re-
sulted within a year and a day from the time of the act which
is alleged to have caused the death. 4 The New York court has
held that this rule has been abrogated by statute in that state;5
but the rule of the common law, still in effect in most jurisdic-
tions, is that death cannot be attributed to a blow or other
harm which preceded it by more than a year and a day. In
such a case the loss of life is attributed to natural causes rather
than to the human act which occurred so long ago.6
1 Kisey v. State, 49 Ariz. 201, 65 P. 2d 1141 (1937).
2 Bracton, Henry de, De Legibus et Consuetudinibus Angliae, (Lon-
don, 1569) New Haven, Yale University Press, 1940, edit. by Woodbine,
George E. p. 340 (f. 120B).
3 Ibid.4 Head v. State, 68 Ga. App. 759, 24 S.E. 2d 145 (1943).
5 People v. Brengard, 265 N.Y. 100, 191 N.E. 850 (1934).
6 State v. Moore, 196 La. 617, 199 So. 661 (1941).
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Problems of causation in homicide cases may be much more
complicated than the one having reference only to the lapse
of time. If, for example, one strikes another with his fist,
causing the other to fall and strike his head on a stone, thereby
incurring an injury requiring an operation, and the victim dies
under an anesthetic properly administered for such operation,
the aggressor is recognized by law as the cause of death.7
The blow caused the fall, which made necessary the opera-
tion for which the anesthetic was administered. It was the
"cause of a cause."" In such a case there is an unbroken chain
of causation and the law looks back to see the original cause.
But if one man strikes another and knocks him down, where-
upon a third takes advantage of the opportunity to inflict a
fatal blow upon the fallen and defenseless man, the one who
struck the first blow is not recognized by law as being the cause
of the death if he did not anticipate the attack by the slayer and
there was no agreement or cooperation between the two with
reference to the attack on the deceased.9 If there was no such
agreement, cooperation or anticipation the act of the third
person is said to be a supervening cause and the death will be
attributed by law solely to that cause even though that person
might never have struck the fatal blow except for the peculiar
opportunity afforded him by having his enemy prostrate at his
feet.
For the same reason, if one man knocks down another and
goes away leaving his victim not seriously hurt but uncon-
scious, on the floor of a building in which the assault occurred,
and before the victim recovers consciousness he is killed in the
fall of the building which is shaken down by a sudden earth-
quake, this is not homicide. The law attributes such a death
to the "Act of God" and not to the assault, even if it may be
certain that the deceased would not have been in the building
at the time of the earthquake, had he not been rendered un-
conscious.' 0 The blow was the occasion of the man's being
7 Regina v. Davis, 15 Cox C. C. 174 (1883).
Other illustrations could be given. The driver of one vehicle ran into
another, frightening the horses attached to the second vehicle and caus-
ing them to run away. The run-away horses overturned that carriage
with fatal consequences to the occupant. The act of the driver of the
first vehicle was held to be the proximate cause of the death. Belk v.
People, 125 Ill. 584, 17 N.E. 744 (1888).
A man struck his wife in the face with his open hand, knocking her
down. As she fell her head came in contact with a chair and death re-
sulted. The blow was held to be the proximate cause of the death.
Commonwealth v. McAfee, 108 Mass. 458 (1871).
The defendant shot a pregnant woman. The wound caused a mis-
carriage, the miscarriage caused septic peritonitis, and the septic peri-
tonitis caused the death of the woman three days later. The shooting
was the proximate cause of the death. People v. Kane, 213 N. Y. 260,
107 N.E. 655 (1915).
8 See Bishop v. State, 73 Ark. 568, 84 S.W. 707 (1905).
9 People v. Flock, 100 Mich. 515, 59 N.W. 237 (1894).
10 See the cases discussed in Green-Wheeler Shoe Co. v. Chicago
R. L and P. Ry. Co., 130 Iowa 123, 106 N.W. 498 (1906).
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there, but the blow did not cause the earthquake, nor was the
deceased left in a position of obvious danger. On the other
hand if the blow had been struck on the sea shore, and the
assailant had left his victim in imminent peril of an incoming
tide which drowned him before consciousness returned, it
would be homicide. The problem could be complicated by
assuming death from a cause neither so obvious nor so wholly
unexpected as those suggested here, but this would involve a
discourse quite beyond the scope of the present undertaking.
Killing of a Human Being - Infanticide. The victim of the
homicide - or alleged homicide - must also receive attention.
The killing of an unborn child is not homicide according to
the common law." Statutes in a few states have provided pun-
ishment under the name of manslaughter for the killing of an
unborn quick child under certain circumstances, 2 and in at
least one state such a killing may constitute murder;13 but most
states still follow the common law rule that there is no homi-
cide of any grade unless the deceased had been born alive. If
a pregnant woman is injured by some act of another person
and a child is born alive who dies of the injury inflicted before
birth,' 4 or who dies because that injury caused it to be born
too soon,15 this is homicide. But if such injury caused the
child to be born dead it is not homicide (except, as mentioned,
in a few states by reason of special enactments). The deed may
be punishable, if committed under circumstances of culpabil-
ity, but is given some other label such as "foeticide,"'6l "abor-
tion" (where death is required by the statute, but the death
of either the mother or the child is specified) ,' or merely
"felony."' 8
A very practical approach to this problem as a matter of
social discipline is the enactment of a special statute making it
a crime to conceal the birth of an infant. Most.of the cases
of killing before birth, or just after, are followed by conceal-
ment of the fact of birth, and could be prosecuted most success-
11 Coke, Sir Edward, Institutes of the Laws of England, London,
Lee and Pakeman, 1648. Third Part, p. 50.
By the ancient common law the killing of an unborn child was homi-
cide, at least if the child had quickened before its death. See Bracton,
Henry de, De Legibus et Consuetudinibus Angliae, (London, 1569) New
Haven, Yale University Press, 1940 edit. by Woodbine, George E., p. 341(f. 121).12Mich. Stats. Ann. (1935) sec. 28.554; Mo. Rev. Stats. (1929) sec.
3991; N. Y. Penal Law (1935) sec. 1050. See also the statutes in Arkan-
sas, Florida, Kansas, Minnesota, Mississippi, Nevada, North Dakota, Ok-
lahoma, Oregon, South Dakota, Washington and Wyoming.
13 See N. M. Stats. (1941) sec. 41-2405.
14 Morgan v. State, 148 Tenn. 417, 256 S.W. 433 (1923).
15 Regina v. West, 2 Car. and K. 784 (1848).
Is See Ga. Code (1933) sec. 26-1103 (making foeticide punishable
by death or imprisonment for life); Neb. Rev. Stats. (1943) see. 28-
404 (one to ten years).
17 Ore. Comp. Laws (1940) sec. 3. 23-408.
1s S. C. Code (1942) sec. 1112.
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fully on that basis. "It has always been difficult to procure
convictions in cases like these," said the Tennessee court
speaking of murder or manslaughter prosecutions based upon
alleged infanticide. "The necessary evidence is hard to obtain.
In England there is a statute making it a crime to conceal the
birth of an infant, and reference to the English cases will show
that most of the convictions obtained are of concealment... . "19
A few of the states in this country have legislation of this na-
ture, such as statutes providing a penalty for concealing birth,20
concealing child's death, 21 concealing the death of a bastard,
22
concealing a child so that it cannot be told whether it was born
dead or alive,23 or attempting to conceal the death of a child.24
The Killing of One Seriously Ill or Wounded. At the other
extreme, since no homicide ever does more than to "hasten the
inevitable event,"25 it is homicide to shorten the life of one suf-
fering from an incurable disease,28 or one already dying from
a mortal injury.27 For example, one who cuts off the head of a
person who was alive when the blow first touched the body, has
killed that person whether the victim had a reasonable life ex-
pectancy of many years, or could not have lived more than an
hour because of some previous injury.28-
On the other hand, two or more, though acting quite inde-
pendently, may be the cause of a single homicide. Thus if A
stabs B with a knife, and a few moments later X, acting quite
independently, shoots B, whereupon B bleeds to death, with
the blood gushing from both injuries, this is homicide by both
A and X.29 B has not been killed twice, but two men contrib-
uted to his death. Since B died from hemorrhage, each of the
wounds shortened his life and the cause of each was a cause of
his death. But if X had chopped off B's head with an axe, B
would have died instantly and no previous injury would have
contributed to his death even if it had been so severe that it
would have caused death if B had not been killed by the axe.30
19 Morgan v. State, 148 Tenn. 417, 421, 256 S.W. 433 (1923).20 Wash. Rev. Stats. (Remington, 1931) sec. 2452.
21 Ark. Dig. of Stats. (1937) sec. 2991.
22 Colo. Ann. Stats. (1935) c. 48, sec. 51; Mich. Stats. Ann. (1935)
sec. 28.347; N. H. Rev. Laws (1942) c. 455, sec. 15.
23 Mo. Rev. Stats. (1939) sec. 4392.
24 N. D. Rev. Code (1943) sec. 12-2505.
25 Commonwealth v. Fox, 73 Mass. 585, 587 (1856).
2 6 State v. Morea, 2 Ala. 275 (1841). And see Nelson v. State, 58
Ga. App. 243, 198 S.E. 305 (1938) ; Gardner v. State, 44 Tex. C. R. 572,
575, 73 S.W. 13 (1903).
27 Walker v. State, 116 Ga. 537, 42 S.E. 587 (1902).2 S People v. Ah Fat, 48 Cal. 61 (1874).
29 Pitts v. State, 53 Okla. Cr. R. 165, 8 P. 2d 78 (1932).
30 A blow is not the cause of death if the loss of life was due solely
to arsenical poisoning. Lewis v. Commonwealth, 19 Ky. L. Rep. 1139, 42
S.W. 1127 (1897).
An injury which would have been mortal is not the cause of death
if some other injury intervened in such a manner that the first was not
a substantial factor in the loss of life. State v. Scates, 50 N. C. (5
Jones) 420 (1858).
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Shooting or otherwise damaging a corpse is not homicide
even if done by one wholly unaware of the lifeless condition of
the body.31
As far as the criminal law is concerned, homicide is divided
into two classes - (1) innocent homicide and (2) criminal
homicide.
Innocent Homicide. Innocent homicide, as a matter of crim-
inal law, means homicide which does not involve criminal
guilt. Whether a killing classed as innocent homicide in crim-
inal law might under some circumstances impose upon the
slayer an obligation to pay damages in a civil action need not
receive attention here.32 Innocent homicide is of two kinds,
(1) justifiable and (2) excusable.33 Homicide is justifiable if
it is either commanded or authorized by law. The two typical
instances in which homicide is commanded by the state are (1)
the killing of an enemy on the field of battle as an act of war
and within the rules of war,34 and (2) the execution of a sen-
tence of death pronounced by a competent tribunal. 5 In cer-
tain other instances a homicide may be duly authorized by
law although not actually commanded by the state. The typi-
cal instances are killings which are necessary in (1) arresting
a felon or preventing his escape or recapturing him after es-
cape;36 (2) lawful self-defense against an assault which places
the slayer in imminent peril of death or great bodily harm,3T
(3) actual resistance of an attempt to commit a violent fel-
ony,38 such as rapes9 or robbery.
Homicide which is neither commanded nor authorized by
law is excusable if committed under circumstances not involv-
ing criminal guilt. Common illustrations include: (1) Kill-
ing as the result of an unfortunate accident by one who was
neither criminally negligent nor engaged in any unlawful act
at the time,40 (2) death caused by a firearm discharged by a
alIt is not homicide to throw into the sea a dead body supposed to
be alive. United States v. Hewson, Fed. Case No. 15,360 (1884).
32 See State v. Baublits, 324 Mo. 1199, 1211, 27 S.W. 2d 16 (1930).
33 Elix v. State, Okla. Cr. R., 138 P. 2d 139 (1943).
34 In re Fair, 100 Fed. 149 (1900) ; Commonwealth v. Shortall, 206
Pa. 165, 55 Atl. 952 (1903). This sometimes receives specific mention
in the statutes. See Tex. Stats. (Vernon, 1936) Pen. Code art. 1208.
85 Hale, Sir Matthew, The History of the Pleas of the CI-Gwn, Lon-
don, F. Gyles, 1736, vol. 1, p. 484. And see Tex. Stats. (Vernon, 1936)
Pen. Code art 1209.
36 People v. Adams, 85 Cal. 231, 24 Pac. 629 (1890) ; Scarbrough v.
State, 168 Tenn. 106, 76 S.W. 2d 106 (1934).37 Foster v. Shepherd, 258 Ill. 164, 101 N.E. 411 (1913). And see
Cook v. State, 194 Miss. 467, 12 So. 2d 137 (1943). As to defense of
the dwelling see Clack v. State, 29 Ala. App. 377, 196 So. 286 (1940).
38 Williams v. State, 70 Ga. App. 10, 27 S.E. 2d 109 (1943).
39 People v. Angeles, 61 Cal. 188 (1882).4 0 Jarich v. People, 58 Colo. 175, 179, 143 Pac. 1092, 1094 (1914);
State v. Brown, S. C. 32 S.E. 2d 825, 828 (1945). This situation is dis-
cussed infra, under "involuntary manslaughter."
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little child 4 1 (3) homicide by a raving maniac, (4) certain
killings in self-defense. The self-defense cases offer a nice dis-
tinction between the proper use of the words "justifiable" and
"excusable" as applied to homicides. Suppose one, himself
free from fault, kills an assailant under the firm belief that this
drastic act is necessary to save himself from death or great bod-
ily harm. If the killing really is necessary to save him from
such grievous harm at the hands of a murderous assailant, it is
authorized by law and hence justifiable. On the other hand,
if he was in no danger at all but was the victim of a practical
joker with a rubber dagger, who played his part so effectively
that the victim reasonably believed he was in imminent danger
of being killed, the law does not authorize the killing but the
homicide is excusable because of the reasonable mistake of
fact.4 Or suppose a murderous attack upon an innocent vic-
tim sufficient to authorize him to kill his assailant but the shot
fired for that purpose misses the assailant and kills a bystander.
The law does not authorize the slayer to kill the bystander; but
if the fatal shot is fired without criminal negligence the homi-
cide is excusable.B
Criminal Homicide. Criminal homicide is homicide without
lawful justification or excuse. Just one offense under the an-
cient common law of England, it was divided into two crimes-
(1) murder and (2) manslaughter - several centuries ago.
Certain statutes played an important role in this division, but
these are so old that murder and manslaughter are entirely
creatures of the common law as far as this country is concerned.
A. MURDER
Murder is homicide committed with malice aforethought.44
Malice Aforethought. The phrase "malice aforethought" is
peculiarly confusing to the layman because each word has a
different significance in legal usage than in ordinary conversa-
tion. Interestingly enough, while the law has gradually whit-
tled away the original meaning of the second of these words, it
apparently employs the term "malice" with very little varia-
tion from its ancient import, whereas the popular usage has
undergone substantial change.
Aforethought. Undoubtedly the word "aforethought" was
added to "malice" in the ancient cases to indicate a design
41 See Unkelsbee v. Homestead Fire Ins. Co., D. C. Mun. App. 41
A. 2d 168 (1945).
42See Wireman v. Commonwealth, 290 Ky. 704, 162 S.W. 2d 557
(1942).43 Pinder v. State, 27 Fla. 370, 8 So. 837 (1891). And see State V.
Metcalfe, 203 Iowa 155, 206 N.W. 620, 212 N.W. 382 (1927); Noe v.
Commonwealth, 290 Ky. 194, 160 S.W. 2d 600 (1942).
44 Commonwealth v. Grieus, 317 Mass. 403, 58 N.E. 2d 241 (1944);
State v. Russell, Utah 145 P. 2d 1003 (1944).
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thought out well in advance of the fatal act. But as case after
case came before the courts for determination, involving kill-
ings under a great variety of circumstances, there came to be
less and less emphasis upon the notion of a well laid plan. And
at the present day the only requirement in this regard is that
it must not be an afterthought. "Killing with malice" is suffi-
cient of itself to negative any possible notion of an after-
thought, and apart from the historical background the word
"aforethought" would not be needed. However, since the
whole development of the mental requirement of the crime of
murder has centered around the words "malice aforethought,"
it will probably be wise to retain this phrase to express the
concept.
The use of the word aforethought, however, must not be per-
mitted to obscure the result. As a matter of law a killing may
be with malice aforethought although it is conceived and exe-
cuted "on the spur of the moment."%5 For example, if one
should find himself alone with a political opponent, and should
suddenly slay the other with a heavy iron bar which hap-
pened to be at hand, the slayer would be guilty of murder even
if no such thought had ever entered his mind before, and he
carried out the idea as rapidly as thought can be translated into
action.
Malice. In ordinary conversation the word "malice" con-
veys some notion of hatred, grudge, ill-will or spite. But no
such idea is incorporated in the legal concept of "malice afore-
thought. '46 Many murders are committed to satisfy a feeling
of hatred or grudge, it is true, but this crime may be perpe-
trated without the slightest trace of personal ill-will. Illustra-
tions include the case of a mother who kills her illegitimate
offspring to hide her own disgrace, feeling at the time no
hatred toward it or any other person and even having the yearn-
ings of a mother's love toward the innocent victim - loving its
life just less than her own reputation.V' There may be added
the case of the husband who killed his wife at her request, be-
,cause his love was too great to permit the continuance of her
suffering from a hopeless disease.48 Even such extreme cases as
these fill every requirement of malice aforethought.
Malice - Intent to Kill or to Inflict Great Bodily Injury. In
fact every intentional killing is with malice aforethought unless
under circumstances sufficient to constitute (1) justification,
(2) excuse or (3) substantial mitigation.49 Any intent to kill
under other circumstances is malicious. The more difficult
45State v. Heidelberg, 120 La. 300, 306, 45 So. 256, 258 (1908).46 People v. Lucas, 244 Ill. 603, 91 N.E. 659 (1910).
47 Jones v. State, 29 Ga. 594, 607 (1860).
48People v. Roberts, 211 Mich. 187, 178 N.W. 690 (1920).49 State v. Pasour, 183 N. C. '793, 111 S.E. 779 (1922).
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aspect of the problem is that there may be malice aforethought
without an actual intent to kill. The older authorities as-
sumed the necessity of an intent to kill and then resorted to an
"implied intent" of this nature when none in fact existed.50
But now the courts speak more factually and say frankly that
murder may be committed under some circumstances without
an intent to kill51 (unless such intent is required by statute in
the particular jurisdiction) .52
An intent to inflict great bodily injury is sufficient for malice
aforethought if there is no justification, excuse or substantial
mitigation. 3 Thus if one should shoot at another's leg, in-
tending to break his leg and keep him inactive for a few weeks,
but not to kill him, this would be murder if the victim should
die and there was no justification, excuse or substantial mitiga-
tion for the shooting. Substantial mitigation most frequently
arises under the so-called "rule of provocation" - to be consid-
ered in connection with manslaughter. Justification or excuse
might arise in many ways. If, for example, a sheriff attempting
to arrest a fleeing murderer finds it impossible to stop him by
milder measures he may shoot. He would not be required to
aim at a leg, but if he should do so with fatal consequences he
would not be guilty of crime. (Nor would he under these facts
if he had aimed at a vital point) .54
Malice - Intent to Do a Dangerous Act in Wanton and Wil-
ful Disregard of Unreasonable Human Risk. Assuming the ab-
sence of justification, excuse or substantial mitigation, an act
may involve such a wanton and wilful disregard of an unrea-
sonable human risk as to constitute malice aforethought even
if there is no actual intent to kill or injure.55 For example, a
50 Echoes of this ancient fiction appear from time to time, as in a
recent Georgia case in which the court said in substance: Legal "malice"
is the intent unlawfully to take human life in cases where the law
neither mitigates nor justifies the killing. Smithwick v. State, Ga. 34
S.E. 2d 28 (1945). But a wanton or reckless state of mind may be the
equivalent of a specific intent to kill and may be treated by the jury as
amounting to such intention when the wilful and intentional perform-
ance of an act is productive of violence resulting in death. Myrick v.
State, Ga. 34 S.E. 2d 36 (1945).
51 Wright v. State, 166 Ga. 1, 141 S.E. 903 (1927); People -V. Hart-
well, 341 Ill. 155, 157, 173 N.E. 112, 113 (1930).
52 For example, a few statutes modify the common law of murder by
adding "purposely" to the definition. See Ohio Gen. Code (Page, 1939)
sec. 12403; Robbins v. State, 8 Ohio St. 131 (1857); Jones v. State, 51
Ohio St. 331, 38 N.E. 79 (1894). See also the statutes of Minnesota,
New York, Oklahoma, South Dakota and Wisconsin.
53 State v. Calabrese, 107 N. J. L. 115, 151 AtI. 781 (1930); Com-
monwealth v. Marshall, 287 Pa. 512, 135 Atl. 301 (1926).
54Petrie v. Commonwealth, 114 Ky. 103, 109, 70 S.W. 297, 299(1902).
55 This is sometimes expressed in the murder statutes in some such
form as this: an unlawful act "imminently dangerous to others and
evincing a depraved mind, in disregard of human life, although without
any premeditated design to effect the death of any particular individ-
ual." N. D. Rev. Code (1943) sec. 12-2708. It is "not the less murder
because there was no actual intent to injure others." Id. at sec. 12-
2710. See also Okla. Stats. (1941) tit. 21, sees. 701, 705.
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man wants to destroy certain property by an explosion which
he has no right to cause. He realizes there is great danger of
killing someone by the kind of explosion he has in mind. He
hopes no one will be killed but is determined to go on with
his unlawful scheme notwithstanding this great risk. After
taking such precautions as he can without abandonment of his
plan he sets off the explosion; but in spite of his precautions
a person is killed. This is homicide with malice aforethought
and hence murder. In the early authorities an intent to kill
was said to be "implied" from his act in such a case in spite of
his obvious effort to avoid killing if possible. Now, as pre-
viously mentioned, this fiction is abandoned and it is frankly
stated that such a reckless and wanton disregard of an obvious
human risk is with malice aforethought even if there was no
actual intent to kill or injure.56
On this basis one may be guilty of murder for death caused
by shooting "regardless of consequences" into a house,5 7 or a
room,58 or a train,5 9 or an automobile,6 0 in which persons are
known to be at the time. "If he did this," said one court in a
case of this nature, "not with the design of killing anyone, but
for his diversion merely, he is guilty of murder."61  In a very
well-known case a man threw a heavy glass tumbler in the di-
rection of his wife. The glass hit a lamp she was carrying and
caused the oil therein to take fire and burn her, causing her
death. This was held to be murder whether he intended the
tumbler to hit his wife, or some other person, or whether, with-
out any specific intent, he threw the glass with a general ma-
licious recklessness, disregarding any and all consequences.6 2
In other words, the intent to do an act under such circum-
stances that there is obviously a plain and strong likelihood
that death or great bodily injury may result, is with malice
aforethought unless done under circumstances of justification,
excuse or substantial mitigation.63
56 "This implication of a species of malice which did not exist seems
to have been invented for the purpose of bringing cases of constructive
murder, so called, within what was supposed to be the legal definition
of the crime. It was evidently supposed...that the phrase, malice afore-
thought, used in indictments for murder, necessarily imputed a charge
of premeditated design to kill. To meet this averment, which in cases
of constructive murder was not required to be proved the law was said
to imply, that is, to supply by mere fiction, the requisite degree of mal-
ice. There was, however, in truth not the slightest necessity for this
fiction; the interpretation of the word malice, on which it was founded,
being entirely erroneous." Darry v. People, 10 N. Y. 120, 138 (1854).
57 People v. Jernatowski, 238 N. Y. 188, 144 N.E. 497 (1924).
58 State v. Capps, 134 N. C. 622, 46 S.E. 730 (1904).
59 Banks v. State, 85 Tex. Cr. R. 165, 211 S.W. 217 (1919).60 Davis v. State, 106 Tex. Cr. R. 300, 292 S.W. 220 (1927).
61 Brown v. Commonwealth, 13 Ky. L. Rep. 372, 373, 17 S.W. 220,
221 (1891).
62Mayes v. People, 106 Ill. 306 (1883).
63 An act done with "knowledge of such circumstances that accord-
ing to common experience there is a plain and strong likelihood that
death will follow the contemplated act." Per Holmes, C. J., in Corn-
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Malice - Intent to Commit a Dangerous Felony - The
"Felony-Murder Rule." An ancient writer spoke of death re-
sulting from any unlawful act as murder. "If the act be un-
lawful," said Coke, "it is murder." 64 Lord Hale was unwilling
to speak in such sweeping terms and gives illustrations of kill-
ings resulting from unlawful acts, some of which he says are
murder, and others manslaughter. 5 This limitation is given
more definite form by Foster, who says that an accidental homi-
cide resulting from an unlawful act (with the qualification-
"if it be malum in se") is murder if the crime be of the grade
of felony, but that otherwise it is manslaughter.6 6 Foster's view
is accepted by Blackstone: "And if one intends to do another
a felony, and undesignedly kills a man, this is also murder."67
Many of the generalizations of the present day seem to indi-
cate, as suggested by* the very name of the so-called "felony-
murder rule," that any homicide resulting from the perpetra-
tion or attempted perpetration of a felony is murder.68  But
Judge Stephen was inclined to believe that this, although an
improvement over the original statement by Coke, is still too
broad. "To take a very old illustration," he said in a famous
case,6 9 "it was said that if a man shot at a fowl with intent to
steal it, and accidentally killed a man, he was to be accounted
guilty of murder, because the act was done in the commission
of a felony. I very much doubt, however, whether that is
really the law, or whether the court for the Consideration of
Crown Cases Reserved would hold it to be so."
The present law of England seems to come closer to the view
of Judge Stephen than to that of any of the earlier writers.
Not every death resulting from an act done in the perpetra-
tion of a felony is murder, but such a homicide may constitute
this crime without the same degree of human risk being in-
volved as would otherwise be requisite. In a case of death
resulting from a felonious act it is not necessary to show the
wilful doing of an act under such circumstances that there is
obviously a plain and strong likelihood that death or great bod-
ily injury may result. On the other hand, the element of hu-
man risk cannot be excluded entirely without at the same time
monwealth v. Chance, 174 Mass. 245, 252, 54 N.E. 551, 554 (1899).
Some of the statutes include, within first degree murder, a killing
by an act greatly dangerous to others, committed under circumstances
evidencing a depraved mind regardless of human life although without
a design to kill. Ala. Code (1940) tit. 14, sec. 314.
64 Coke, Sir Edward, Institutes of .the Laws of England, London,
Lee and Packman, 1648, Third Part, p. 56.
65 Hale, Sir Matthew, The History of the Pleas of the Crown, Lon-
don, F. Gyles, 1736, vol. 1, p. 465.
66 Foster, Sir Michael, Crown Case Reports, London, W. Clark and
Sons, 1809, edit. 3, p. 258.67 Blackstone, Sir William, Commentaries on the Laws of England,
Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1768, Book 4, pp. 200-1.
68 Commonwealth v. Gricus, 317 Mass. 403, 58 N.E. 2d 241 (1944).
69 Regina v. Serne, 16 Cox C. C. 311, 312-3 (1887).
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eliminating the possibility of murder. "If a man by the per-
petration of a felonious act brings about the death of a fellow
creature he is guilty of murder, unless when he committed the
felonious act the chance of death resulting therefrom was so
remote that no reasonable man would have taken it into con-
sideration. In that case he is not guilty of murder, but only of
manslaughter." 70
Such a position has much to commend it. It places upon a
man who is committing or attempting a felony the hazard of
guilt of murder if he creates any substantial human risk which
actually results in the loss of life; and it does this without in-
cluding within this offense those homicides which occur so un-
expectedly that no reasonable man would have considered any
risk of this nature involved. Certain felonies have been at-
tended so frequently with death or great bodily harm, even
when not intended or contemplated by the particular wrong-
doer, that they must be classified as "dangerous." 7' Common
experience points to the presence of a substantial human risk
from the mere perpetration of such wrongful acts as arson,
burglary, rape or robbery. The intent to avoid all personal
harm, formed in the mind of the transgressor at the time he
embarks upon such felonies, is no reasonable safeguard that
death will not result before he has finished. If we add to the
misdeeds mentioned the crime of larceny and those offenses
which directly contemplate death or great bodily harm, we will
have completed the list of common-law felonies.7 2  In other
words, with the single exception of larceny, the common-law
felonies were either directed toward death or great bodily in-
jury, or involved a substantial risk of this nature. And while
an attempted larceny happens to be the subject of a much cited
dictum, 73 a study of the cases repeating the formula that homi-
70 Regina v. Whitemarsh, 62 Just. P. 711 (1898). The quotation is
from the syllabus. To the same general effect see Rex v. Lumley, 22 Cox
C. C. 635 (1911).
71 It has not been uncommon to provide by statute that murder com-
mitted by perpetrating or attempting certain felonies shall be of the first
degree. See, for example, Ariz. Code (Off. 1939) sec. 43-12902; Cal.
Pen. Code (Deering, 1941) sec. 189; Conn. Gen. Stat. (1930) sec. 6403.
The list of offenses so named quite generally includes arson, burglary,
rape and robbery. The fact that the element of human risk involved
has been influential in the framing of such statutes is emphasized by
additions to this list, such as mayhem, which is common, or "injury to
any person or property by means of any explosive compound" (Conn.).
72 Pollock and Maitland add false imprisonment. Pollock, Sir Fred-
erick, and Maitland, Frederic William, The History of English Law, edit.
2, Cambridge, University Press (and Boston, Little, Brown and Com-
pany) 1899, p. 470. But see Blackstone, Sir William, Commentaries (n
the Laws of England, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1767, Book 3, p. 127.
It may be added that false imprisonment is by no means free from
the risk of human harm.
73 Rex v. Plummer, Kel. 109, 117 (1701). "So if two men have a
design to steal a hen, and one shoots at the hen for that purpose, and a
man be killed, it is murder in both, because the design was felonious."
But the actual case involved armed resistance to arrest which is unques-
tionably dangerous.
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cide resulting from a felony is murder, will disclose that the
felony actually involved in any such case is usually one which
may properly be classed as "dangerous," such as robbery,7 4
rape,75 burglary,76 arson,77 malicious burning,78 or criminal
abortion.79
To test whether the so-called "felony-murder rule," in its
unlimited form, actually represents the law in this country,
it is necessary to consider felonies of a non-dangerous nature.
Furthermore, an additional caution must be added. One who
is perpetrating a felony which seems not of itself to involve
any element of human risk, may resort to a dangerous method
of committing it, or may make use of dangerous force to deter
others from interfering. If the dangerous force thus used re-
sults in death, the crime is murder just as much as if the dan-
ger was inherent in the very nature of the felony itself. For
obvious reasons a felony which does not of itself involve any
substantial element of human risk, and which is not accom-
panied in the particular instance by the use of dangerous force,
will very rarely result in the death of a human being. Because
of this very few cases squarely raise the question. The matter,
however, has not escaped attention in this country. The Ken-
tucky Court has given a striking illustration in a very famous
case.80 "Under our statute," said the court, "the removal of a
cornerstone is punishable by a short term in the penitentiary,
and is therefore a felony. If, in attempting this offense, death
were to result to one conspirator by his fellow accidentally
dropping the stone upon him, no Christian court would hesi-
tate to apply this limitation." The "limitation" mentioned is
that the homicide would be manslaughter rather than murder
notwithstanding it resulted from the commission of a felony.
An intimation to this effect, though not so directly stated, was
mentioned by the New Jersey Court over a hundred years
ago.81
The leading American decision on this point is one handed
down in Michigan .s2 The defendant sold liquor under cir-
74 People v. Koerber, 244 N. Y. 147, 152, 155 N.E. 79, 82 (1926).
75 State v. Cross, 72 Conn. 722, 729, 46 Atl. 148, 151 (1900); Com-
mionwealth v. Gricus, 317 Mass. 403, 58 N.E. 2d 241 (1944).76 People v. Greenwall, 115 N. Y. 520, 522-3, 22 N.E. 180 (1889).
77 State v. Cooper, 13 N. J. L. 361, (1883).78 Regina v. Horsey, 3 Fost. and F. 287, 288-9 (1862).
7 State v. Leeper, 70 Iowa 748, 30 N.W. 501 (1886).
80 Powers v. Commonwealth, 110 Ky. 386, 416, 61 S.W. 935, 63 S.W.
776 (1901).
81 In stating the rule that death resulting from felony is murder,
the court added this significant qualification, - "especially if death were
a probable consequence of the act." State v. Cooper, 13 N. J. L. 361,
370 (1833). This qualification requires a greater degree of human risk
than would be insisted upon for malice aforethought in a felony case,
but it indicates that the court, even at that time, was not entirely sat-
isfied with the statement in unlimited form.
s2 People v. Pavli, 227 Mich. 562, 119 N.W. 373 (1924).
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cumstances amounting to a felony, to a purchaser who became
drunk and died from exposure. The court refused to hold
that the mere fact of this accidental death resulting from such
a felony was murder. "Notwithstanding the fact that the stat-
ute has declared it to be a felony," reads the opinion, "'it is
an act not in itself directly and naturally dangerous to life."
The "felony-murder rule" is often couched in some such
form as this: "Homicide committed while perpetrating or at-
tempting a felony is murder." This suggests mere coincidence
as sufficient for the result; but the actual requirement is causa-
tion. It is necessary to show that "death ensued in consequence
of the felony."8' 3 It is not necessary, however, to show that the
killing was intended or even that the act resulting in death was
intended. It may have been quite unexpected. If the victim
of a robbery attempts to disarm his assailant, and is killed by
an accidental discharge of the weapon during a struggle for its
possession, the robber is guilty of murder.8 4 Emphasis upon
causation rather than coincidence is important also for quite
a different reason. If the killing resulted from the perpetra-
tion of the felonious design it falls within the rule even if the
felony itself had been completed before the fatal blow was
struck. It is homicide resulting from robbery, for example,
although the robber had taken the money from his victim and
was running away with it when the killing occurred. 5 And a
killing has been committed during the perpetration or at-
tempted perpetration of rape, if the fatal blow was struck eith-
er to render the victim helpless before the attack or while it
was taking place, or to still her outcries after the act was com-
pleted, as an incident of the rape and at the scene thereof.86
Another point must not be overlooked. It would be futile
to recognize the sudden heat of passion, engendered by great
provocation, as sufficiently mitigating to reduce a voluntary
homicide to manslaughter, if in the next breath it was added
that manslaughter is a dangerous felony and hence any homi-
cide resulting from such an attempt must be murder. The dis-
tinction between murder and manslaughter, felonies both,
makes it necessary to qualify any rule as to homicide resulting
from felony by limiting it to felonies other than felonious
homicide itself. This has usually been taken for granted, but
at times has been forced upon the attention of the court. In
such cases it has been held essential, in order to bring the case
within the "felony-murder rule," that the slayer was engaged
83 Buel v. People, 78 N. Y. 492, 497 (1879).
84 State v. Best, 44 Wyo. 383, 12 P. 2d 1110 (1932).
85 State v. McCarthy, 160 Ore. 196, 83 P. 2d 801 (1938).
86 Ccqmmonwealth v. Gricus, 317 Mass. 403, 58 N.E. 2d 241 (1944).
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in some other felony, so distinct "as not to be an ingredient of
the homicide" itself.87
Legislation in a particular jurisdiction may change this rule
of the common law, the same as any other. If the statute
changes the common law by adding the word "purposely" in
the definition of murder, an unintentional killing will not
qualify even if it results from a dangerous felony.88 If the
statute dealing with involuntary manslaughter includes under
that offense any involuntary killing "in the perpetration of or
attempt to .perpetrate any unlawful act, other than arson, rape,
robbery, burglary, or mayhem,"8' 9 this shows a limitation of the
"felony-murder rule" not only to a dangerous felony but to
these particular five.90 At the other extreme, a statute provid-
ing that "the killing of a human being without any design to
effect death by a person engaged in the commission of any fel-
ony" shall be murder seems to cover every case in which there
was a legally recognizable causal connection between the fel-
onious act and the death, however remote the element of hu-
man risk may seem to have been.91
In the absence of these or other statutory changes the "fel-
ony-murder rule" should be stated as follows: Homicide is
murder if the death ensues in consequence of the perpetration
or attempted perpetration of some other felony unless such
other felony was not dangerous of itself and the method of its
perpetration or attempt did not appear to involve any appre-
ciable human risk. To this may be added the explanation,
previously suggested, that the danger here referred to may fall
considerably short of a plain and strong likelihood that death
or great bodily injury will result, but must not be so remote
that no reasonable man would have taken it into consideration.
87State v. Fisher, 120 Kan. 226, 230, 243 Pac. 291, 293 (1926);
People v. Huter, 184 N. Y. 237, 244, 77 N.E. 6, 8 (1906).
88 See Ohio Code (1930) sec. 12403; Robbins v. State, 8 Ohio St. 131
(1857). Compare section 12401 in which the word "purposely" does not
appear.
An interesting federal case gives a comparison of the Ohio law with
the Missouri law in this regard. United Commercial Travelers of Amer-
ica v. Meinsen, 131 F. 2d 176 (C.C.A. 8th, 1942).
89 Idaho Code (1932) sec. 17-1106.
90 The statutory limitation is at times even narrower. For exam-
ple, the Mississippi Code is similar to that of Idaho in this respect, but
includes only arson, rape, robbery and burglary. Miss. Code (1943)
see. 2220. But as mayhem involves a malicious intent to inflict great
bodily harm a resulting homicide is murder for a reason other than the
"felony-murder rule." The Louisiana Code specifies aggravated arson,
burglary, aggravated kidnaping, aggravated rape, and robbery. La.Crim. Stats. (1943) art. 740-30.
91 See Wis. Stat. (1943) sec. 340.09; N. Y. Pen. Law (Gilbert,
1943) sec. 1044. And see State v. Welch, 25 P. 2d 211 (N. M. 1933);Morris v. State, 68 Okla. Cr. R. 147, 96 P. 2d 88 (1939).
The same legislative intent is indicated by including under the head
of manslaughter, an involuntary homicide in the commission of an un-
lawful act not amounting to felony. See Ariz. Code (Off. 1939) see. 43-




Malice - Intent to Resist Lawful Arrest. Homicide result-
ing from resistance to a lawful arrest seems to require a simi-
lar explanation. It was stated by the early writers that the
killing of one who was making a lawful arrest was murder.
92
And it has frequently been stated that homicide resulting from
resistance to lawful arrest, with knowledge of the facts, is mur-
der. However, a study of the cases in which this statement
appears will ordinarily disclose that the killing resulted from
shooting9 3 or from the use of some other dangerous force, such
as stabbing with a knife94 or striking with a heavy clubW5 It
is sometimes said that no particular malice is required to es-
tablish murder in such a case; 96 but it would be more accurate
to say that one who is resisting a lawful arrest (that is, an ar-
rest which is authorized by law and is being made in a proper
manner) is acting without justification, excuse,97 or provoca-
tion,98 and hence his intent to make use of deadly force is
malice aforethought.
The act of resisting arrest is not likely to result in death if
made under circumstances which seem to involve no substan-
tial element of human risk. Unexpected accidents have hap-
pened, however, even in such situations; and these cases have
forced the courts to re-examine the statement that any homi-
cide resulting from resistance to lawful arrest, knowing it to
be lawful arrest, is murder. The rule developed by these cases
is that such homicide is manslaughter only if the loss of life
was brought about quite unexpectedly from the use of force
which seemed to involve no substantial element of human risk;
but the use of force at all likely to cause human harm will be
sufficient for malice aforethought if it is used by one who is
resisting what he knows to be a lawful attempt to arrest him,
even if it is a type of force that might not be sufficient for this
purpose under other circumstances.
An interesting case involved these facts. One who was be-
92 Coke, Sir Edward, Institutes of the Laws of England, 1648, Third
Part, p. 52; Hale, Sir Matthew, The History of the Pleas of the Crown,
England, 1678, vol. 1, p. 457.
93 Cornett v. Commonwealth, 198 Ky. 236, 248 S.W. 540 (1923);
Sexon v. Commonwealth, 239 Ky. 177, 179, 39 S.W. 2d 229, 230 (1931);
State v. Genese, 102 N. J. L. 134, 130 Atl. 642 (1925).
94 State v. Zeibart, 40 Iowa 169 (1874).
95 Glaze v. State, 156 Ga. 807, 120 S.E. 530 (1923).96 Donehy and Prather v. Commonwealth, 170 Ky. 474, 186 S.W.
161 (1916). The killing was by shooting.
97 If there is legal authorization for the arrest and it is being made
in a proper manner the person to be arrested has no right to resist.
Floyd v. State, 82 Ala. 16, 2 So. 683 (1886). This is true even if he is
innocent of the charge for which he is being arrested. Ibid. As the
one being arrested is entirely in the wrong if he resists, he cannot in-
voke the principle of self-defense. White v. State, 70 Miss. 253, 11 So.
632 (1892).
98 A lawful arrest "can, of itself, be no provocation in law, since
every person is bound to submit to the regular course of justice." State
v. Spaulding, 34 Minn. 361, 363, 25 N.W. 793 (1885).
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ing lawfully arrested, objected to being put in a vehicle which
was to take him to jail. As he was being forced inside, his foot
came in contact with the head of one of his arresters, with
fatal consequences. In a trial for murder the judge directed
the jury to inquire into the circumstances of the actual con-
tact, and to find the defendant guilty of murder if it resulted
from a kick intentionally directed at the deceased, or anyone
else; but to find the defendant guilty of manslaughter only, if
they should find the blow was not an intentional kick, but an
unintentional contact while the defendant was merely strug-
gling in the effort to keep out of the vehicle. The verdict in
that case was "guilty of manslaughter."9 9 The same problem
was presented in quite a different form in another case. An
officer stepped upon the running board of defendant's car for
the purpose of making an arrest which was entirely lawful
under the circumstances. The defendant was quite near the
state line at the moment and attempted to drive across a bridge
into the neighboring jurisdiction. In this attempt the car
struck the bridge and the officer was killed. It is quite possi-
ble that the act may have been sufficiently dangerous to sup-
port a conviction of murder; but the jury was not permitted
to inquire into this aspect of the matter. The trial judge had
in mind the old statement that one who has caused death by
resisting an arrest he knew to be lawful is guilty of murder,
and he submitted the case to the jury on this basis. This was
held to be such prejudicial error as to call for a new trial. The
defendant was entitled to have the jury determine whether his
wrongful conduct in resisting a lawful arrest did, or did not,
involve a substantial element of human risk. 00
"Man-Endangering-State-of-Mind." Since murder cannot be
adequately defined in terms of an intent to kill, without resort
to the ancient fiction whereby such an intent was "implied"
in certain cases in which it did not exist in fact, some other
phrase must be used. And since malice aforethought is neither
a self-explanatory phrase, as used in the law, nor one which
designates any single and invariable frame of mind, it is prob-
ably wise to employ a phrase to which a meaning may be as-
signed quite arbitrarily. The phrase "man-endangering-state-
of-mind" is suggested for this purpose with the assumption that
it be arbitrarily understood to include every attitude of mind
which includes (1) an intent to kill, or (2) an intent to inflict
great bodily injury, or (3) an intent to do an act in wanton
and wilful disregard of an unreasonable human risk (i.e. the
99Regina v. Porter, 12 Cox C. C. 444 (1873).
10o Sate v. Weisengoff, 85 W. Va. 271, 101 S.E. 450 (1919).
The Louisiana Code expressly provides that it is manslaughter to
kill by resisting arrest by means and in a manner not inherently dan-
gerous. La. Crim. Stats. (1943) art. 740-30.
ROLLIN M. PERKINS
wilful doing of an act under such circumstances that there is
obviously a plain and strong likelihood that death or great
bodily injury may result), or (4) an intent to perpetrate a
dangerous felony, or a felony not dangerous in itself, by means
involving a substantial element of human risk (or under some
statutes any felony) or (5) an intent to resist a lawful arrest by
means involving a substantial element of human risk. 01
Definition of Malice Aforethought. The phrase "man-en-
dangering-state-of-mind," if accepted for this purpose and with
this explanation, tells only part of the story, for such a state of
mind will not constitute malice aforethought if there are cir-
cumstances of justification, excuse or mitigation. It is the
course of caution to call attention to the fact that malice afore-
thought is a matter of mind, however convenient it may be to
speak in terms of the absence of circumstances of justification,
excuse or mitigation. It is a psychical fact just as homicide is
a physical fact. It is the particular kind of mens rea or mind
at fault required for the more serious of the two types of felon-
ious homicide. Perhaps it would be more accurate to speak
of it as a label placed upon a group of states of mind, any one
of which is sufficient for murder. A man-endangering-state-of-
mind is not malice aforethought if there are circumstances of
justification, excuse or mitigation; but such a state of mind in
the presence of these circumstances is a different psychical fact
than it would be if they were wanting. An intent to kill, to
give a very limited illustration, may be the same intent, in a
certain sense, whether it is for self-preservation, or is formed
in a sudden rage engendered by great provocation, or is part
of a well-laid plan for financial gain; but the psychical fact in
its totality is not the same in any two of these. Furthermore,
the appraisal or evaluation of appearances is also a psychical
fact. Hence an intent to kill for the purpose of self-defense
under circumstances in which there is reasonable ground for
believing this drastic step to be necessary, is psychically differ-
ent from an intent to kill in self-defense with the same belief
but when there is nothing to warrant such a belief. In fact no
inquiry into justification, excuse or mitigation in a homicide
case can be dissociated from the mental element involved in
criminal guilt. Perhaps the most extreme test of this point is
found in the act of carrying out a lawful sentence of death.
If a sheriff is carrying out such a sentence what difference
does it make what his state of mind may be? The fallacy in-
101 A recent case overlooked the fifth subdivision but included the
other four, pointing out that malice arises from a design to kill, or to
do great bodily injury, or the design to do an act knowing that it is
likely to cause death or great bodily injury, or the design to perpetrate
one of the felonies designated in the statute. State v. Russell, Utah,
145 P. 2d 1003 (1944).
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volved in this question lies in the fact that the mental ele-
ment - the mind without fault - has been satisfied by the as-
sumption that he is "carrying out" a lawful sentence of death.
If a sheriff who had no knowledge of any sentence of death
having been pronounced should take the life of his prisoner
for some unlawful purpose of his own, it would be no answer
to a murder charge that there existed, unknown to him, a man-
date for him to execute that man on that very day. The ex-
treme unlikelihood of the officer's being unaware of the exist-
ence of the sentence does not affect the legal view of the situa-
tion. The knowledge that he is carrying out a sentence of the
court makes this altogether different as a psychical fact than if
he acted in ignorance of this matter. A felon may be killed
lawfully under certain circumstances other than the execution
of a sentence of death, as for example where this is the only
means of preventing him from murdering an innocent victim,
or of stopping his flight from arrest after the murder is com-
mitted. And there is an interesting case in which the killing
of an actual felon under circumstances sufficient to justify the
killing, had the facts been known, was held not to constitute
a justification in favor of one who did not know or have any
reason to believe that the person was a felon.10 2
With this emphasis upon the fact that the focus is centered
entirely upon the mental facts involved, although the mental
picture cannot be portrayed adequately without reference to
peculiarities in the factual situation in which the mind is called
upr'n to function, the following definition is suggested: Malice
aforethought is an unjustifiable, inexcusable and unmitigated
man-endangering-state-of-mind. In other words this phrase re-
quires the presence of one, or more, of the five intents men-
tioned above and the absence of every sort of justification, ex-
cuse or substantial mitigation.
Even an intentional killing is no crime at all if done under
circumstances constituting a legally recognized justification or
excuse. Such a homicide is not criminal, and this field has been
considered above under the heading of "innocent homicide."
It is unnecessary to repeat here what was said in that connec-
tion. By definition a man-endangering-state-of-mind does not
constitute malice aforethought if it is justifiable or excusable.
A man-endangering-state-of-mind may fall short of malice
aforethought even in the absence of justification or excuse.
This is because of the requirement that it must also be un-
mitigated. As a matter of juridical science, any circumstance
of substantial mitigation should be sufficient to reduce to man-
slaughter, a killing that would otherwise be murder. Suppose,
for example, the defendant thought he was in imminent dan-
102 People v. Burt, 51 Mich. 199, 16 N.W. 378 (1833).
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ger of death and must kill to save himself from being mur-
dered, and that he did kill for that reason. Suppose, also, there
was no actual danger to his life at the moment, and the facts
fell a little short of reasonable grounds for a belief in such dan-
ger. His homicide is not excused; but if the circumstances
came rather close to such as would constitute an excuse his
guilt is of manslaughter rather than murder,103 assuming the
absence of any peculiar statute in the jurisdiction which might
change the common law in this regard. For the same reason,
a killing to prevent crime may fall short of justification or ex-
cuse and yet come close enough to be regarded as having been
committed under circumstances of substantial mitigation, suffi-
cient to reduce the homicide to manslaughter. 04 In the vast
majority of cases, however, such mitigation has involved the so-
called "rule of provocation."
B. MANSLAUGHTER
Classification of Manslaughter. The common law tended to
focus attention upon two points in homicide cases. At one side,
careful attention was given to homicides committed with mal-
ice aforethought. At the other extreme, close study was given
to all claims of justification or excuse in homicide cases. All
homicides committed without malice aforethought, but also
without justification or excuse, were dealt with as manslaugh-
ter.10 5 Hence this is definitely a "catch-all" group, and con-
fusion can best be avoided by thinking of this crime in terms
of this process of elimination. Manslaughter is any homicide
which is neither murder nor innocent homicide, - and such a
killing may be either intentional or unintentional. 10 6
Manslaughter is commonly referred to as being of two kinds,
- (1) voluntary and (2) involuntary. This was purely a fac-
tual distinction at common law, the punishment being the
same for both. Some statutes use the common-law plan in this
regard,10 7 some follow the same plan except for the establish-
ment of a different penalty for the two types mentioned,108 and
a few have an entirely different scheme of classification as will
be pointed out under "degrees of criminal homicide."
103 Bliss v. State, 117 Wis. 596, 94 N.W. 325 (1903).
104 Williams v. State, 127 Miss. 851, 90 So. 705 (1922).
105 Some of the statutes have employed this definition. For exam-
ple: "Every other killing of a human being by the act, procurement, or
culpable negligence of another, when such killing is not murder in the
first or second degree, or is not justifiable or excusable as provided in
this chapter, shall be deemed manslaughter." Oreg. Comp. Laws (1940)
see. 3.23-410. See also Fla. Comp. Stats. Ann. (1941) sec. 782.07;
N. Y. Pen. Law (Gilbert, 1943) sec. 1049.
'
0 6 People v. Freel, 48 Cal. 436, 437 (1874) ; Dye v. State, 127 Miss.
492, 90 So. 180 (1921); State v. Nortin, 170 Ore. 296, 133 P. 2d 252
(1943).
107 See, for example, Iowa Code (1939) sec. 12919.
108 See, for example, Utah Code (1943) sec. 103-28-6.
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An act causing death may have been intentional or uninten-
tional. Moreover, an intended act may have unintended con-
sequences. If death results from shooting, for example, the
discharge itself may have been intentional or unintentional;
and if the one holding the gun purposely pulled the trigger,
the resulting loss of life may have been the very end he was
seeking to achieve, or it may not have been contemplated by
him at all, - to mention only the extreme possibilities. Hence
in such a case it is essential to distinguish between an inten-
tional shooting and an intentional killing. An intentional
act, in the sense of pulling a trigger or driving an automobile,
may cause involuntary manslaughter; 0 9 but an intentional kill-
ing cannot fall within this category." 0 The other side of the
problem is not so simple. Many statements can be found to
the effect that voluntary manslaughter requires an intentional
killing;"' but the tendency has been to give the phrase a mean-
ing broad enough to cover any killing with a man-endangering-
state-of-mind that is neither murder nor innocent homicide.112
This latter usage has the advantage of simplicity because un-
lawful homicide with a man-endangering-state-of-mind is mur-
der in the absence of mitigation, whereas unlawful homicide
without such a state of mind is only manslaughter in any
event." 3
(1): VOLUNTARY MANSLAUGHTER
It is not the purpose of the law to unbridle the passions of
men. On the contrary, one very important aim of the crimi-
nal law is to induce men to keep their passions under proper
control. At the same time the law does not ignore the weak-
nesses of human nature. Hence, as a matter of common law,
an unlawful killing may even be intentional and yet of a lower
grade than murder."x4 This has been changed in some jurisdic-
109 State v. MoVay, 47 R. I. 292, 297, 132 Ati. 436 (1926).
11o Jeffries v. State, 23 Ala. App. 401, 126 So. 177 (1930); Nichols
v. State, 187 Ark. 999, 63 S.W. 2d 655, 657 (1933). And see Jackson v.
State, 69 Ga. App. 707, 26 S.E. 2d 485 (1943).
111 See, for example, Alexander v. State, 160 Ga. 769, 129 S.E. 102
(1925); Curtis v. Commonwealth, 169 Ky. 727, 184 S.W. 105 (1916);
People v. Ryczek, 224 Mich. 106, 194 N.W. 609 (1923).
112 See, for example, Reynolds v. State, 154 Ala. 14, 17, 45 So. 894
(1908) ; Burchett v. Commonwealth, 247 Ky. 21, 56 S.W. 2d 571 (1933) ;
State v. Cantieny, 34 Minn. 1, 24 N.W. 458 (1885); Commonwealth v.
Micuso, 237 Pa. 474, 477, 117 AtI. 211 (1922) ; Beauregard v. State, 146
Wis. 280, 285, 131 N.W. 347 (1911).
The requirement of a "voluntary killing" for first degree man-
slaughter is satisfied if death resulted from an act greatly dangerous
to the lives of others. Rainey v. State, Ala. ... , 17 So. 2d 687 (1944).
113 The phrase "man-endangering-state-of-mind" is used arbitrarily
to include the state of mind of one intending to commit a dangerous fel-
ony (or in some jurisdictions any felony), as well as the intent to kill,
the intent to inflict great bodily injury or the intent to do an act which
obviously involves a strong likelihood that death or great bodily injury
may result. See under "malice aforethought."
114 People v. Slater, 60 Cal. App. 2d 358, 371, 140 P. 2d 846 (1943).
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tions by a statutory definition of murder broad enough to in-
clude such homicides. This is true, for example, where the en-
actment provides in substance that the killing of a human be-
ing; unless excusable or justifiable, is murder when perpetrated
with a design to effect the death of the person killed or an-
other 15 (and also in certain instances when committed without
such design). As such change is the exception rather than the
rule it is important to give careful consideration to the com-
mon law in this regard.
The common statement with reference to the first type is
this: An intentional homicide committed in a sudden rage of
passion engendered by adequate provocation, and not the result
of malice conceived before the provocation, is voluntary man-
slaughter. It is necessary to add that intentional homicide
committed under other circumstances of mitigation may be
voluntary manslaughter; but the consideration of those prob-
lems will be postponed for later consideration because they are
not involved in most of the actual cases.
The "Rule of Provocation." In order for a killing which
would otherwise be murder to be reduced to manslaughter
under the "rule of provocation" there are four requirements:
(1) There must have been adequate provocation.
(2) The killing must have been in the heat of passion.
(3) It must have been a sudden heat of passion - that is,
the killing must have followed the provocation before there
had been a reasonable opportunity for the passion to cool.
(4) There must have been a causal connection between the
provocation, the passion, and the fatal act.
Adequate Provocation. There must not only be provocation,
but provocation of such a nature as to be recognized by law as
adequate"16 for this purpose. To emphasize this requirement
some courts have spoken in other terms such as great 17 provo-
cation or lawful"" provocation. The latter form of expression
is objectionable because the provocation is itself an unlawful
act of another, since a lawful act, even if it involves physical
violence, is not recognized by law as a mitigating circum-
115 "The killing of a human being, unless it is excusable or justifi-
able, is murder in the first degree when perpetrated with a premeditated
design to effect the death of the person killed or another, and shall be
punished by imprisonment for life in the state prison.
"Such killing of a human being is murder in the second degree, when
committed with a design to effect the death of the person killed or of
another, but without deliberation and premeditation...." Minn. Stats.(Mason, 1927) secs. 10,067, 10,068. (The following section does not re-
quire such design). See also the statutes of New York, Oklahoma, South
Dakota and Wisconsin.
116McHargue v. Commonwealth, 231 Ky. 82, 87, 31 S.W. 2d 115
(1929).
117 State "v. Horn, 116 N. C. 1037, 21 S.E. 604 (1895).118 State v. McKinzie, 102 Mo. 620, 633, 15 S.W. 149 (1890).
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stance.11 9 The choice between the other two is merely a mat-
ter of convenience; the result is the same whether the require-
ment is worded in terms of "adequate provocation" or "great
provocation." A provocation not "adequate" or "great'"
enough to reduce a voluntary killing to manslaughter may
nevertheless be sufficient to bring it within the category of sec-
ond degree murder rather than first,120 or to entitle it to con-
sideration in the assessment of the punishment for murder if
the law gives discretion in this regard; 121 but such are not the
problems under consideration here.
The problem of provocation in the homicide cases cannot
be considered effectively without keeping constantly in mind
the relation of the retaliatory act to the provocative one. The
foundation principle is that where the former is not unreason-
ably excessive and out of proportion to the latter, the basis of
mitigation is established (if the latter was not altogether in-
adequate); but where it is unreasonably excessive and out of
proportion no mitigation will be recognized.122 Thus a greater
provocation will be required to reduce an intentional killing
to manslaughter than would be sufficient for this purpose if
the homicide was not actually intended, although under cir-
cumstances that would make it murder apart from the rule of
provocation. 23
Whether or not a certain provocation is legally adequate for
this purpose is determined by an objective test.1 24 The ques-
tion is not its effect upon the particular person, but the effect
it would be expected to produce upon the ordinary reasonable
man. To be "adequate" the provocation must be of a nature
calculated to inflame the passions of the ordinary reasonable
man. 25 The standard is the same for all men, - sober or
drunk.126
Adequate Provocation - Battery. Not every technical bat-
tery is sufficient to constitute adequate provocation, 27 but a
hard blow inflicting considerable pain or injury will ordinarily
be sufficient. 28 Knocking a person down with a heavy stick, 29
or hitting him over the head with a revolver,130 are rather ob-
vious instances of such force; but a weapon is not indispensa-
19 Holmes v. State, 88 Ala. 26, 30, 7 So. 193 (1889); State v.
Spaulding, 34 Minn. 361, 364, 25 N.W. 793 (1885).
120 State v. Robinson, Mo. ... , 185 S.W. 2d 636 (1945).
121 Kiersey v. State, 131 Ark. 287, 491, 199 S.W. 532 (1917).
122 State v. Ellis, 101 N. C. 765, 7 S.E. 704 (1888).
123 State v. Hoyt, 13 Minn. 132 (1868). And see State v. Vance, 17
Iowa 138, 144-5 (1864).
124 People v. Gingell, 211 Cal. 532, 545, 296 Pac. 70 (1931).
125 Rivers v. State, 75 Fla. 401, 407, 78 So. 343 (1918).
126 Bishop v. United States, 107 F. 2d 297 (App. D. C., 1939).
127 Commonwealth v. Webb, 252 Pa. 187, 97 At. 189 (1916).
128 State v. Joiner, 161 La. 518, 524, 109 So. 561 (1926).
129 State v. Brodnox,. 61 N. C. 41 (1866).
130 Scott v. State, 49 Tex. Cr. R. 386, 93 S.W. 112 (1906).
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ble for this purpose. Thus even a blow with the fist may be
sufficient to reduce an intentional killing to manslaughter, 13
particularly if it is a blow in the face132 or a "staggering"
blow.13 3
The need of considering all of the circumstances of the par-
ticular case must not be overlooked. In one case, for example,
a man killed his wife by inflicting five slashes with a razor after
she had hit him over the head with a small poker about fifteen
inches long. He claimed the blow caused a swelling but it
left no mark visible later in the day. This killing was held to
have been without adequate provocation' 3 4 although no one
would doubt the possibility of a blow with a fifteen-inch poker
being sufficient for mitigation if struck with sufficient violence.
No amount of force which an individual was privileged by
law to use will be recognized as adequate provocation, and
hence the hard blow must have been unlawful to meet the pres-
ent requirement. 35
Adequate Provocation - Assault. If an assault results in a
battery, the latter receives chief attention as far as provocation
is concerned. There are homicide cases, however, in which the
fatal force was used by the slayer because of an actual or ap-
parent attempt to commit a battery upon him although it did
not result in an actual application of force to his person. In
these cases it is necessary to make a sharp distinction between
defensive force and vindictive force. If the one assailed has
killed his assailant within the legal privilege of self-defense he
is guilty of no crime at all. 36 That is not the present problem.
For the moment we are concerned with a killing caused, not
in self-defense, but in the heat of passion engendered by an
attack that failed and after the immediate danger had passed.
In one case, for example, deceased shot at the defendant and
missed him. This so angered the defendant that he shot the
other in the back while he was running away, thus causing
his death. This was clearly not within the privilege of self-
defense, but this provocation was held sufficient to reduce the
grade of homicide to manslaughter. 37
An unsuccessful attempt to commit a battery is seldom likely
to arouse the same degree of passion in a reasonable man as
will be engendered by the actual blow intended. Hence the
fact that the assailant did not actually hit the defendant is one
131 State v. Ferell, 320 Mo. 319, 6 S.W. 2d 857 (1928).
132 Stewart v. State, 78 Ala. 436, 440 (1885).
'33 State v. Yarbrough, 8 N. C. 78 (1820).
'34 Commonwealth v. Webb, 252 Pa. 187, 97 AtI. 189 (1916).
'35 Holmes v. State, 88 Ala. 26, 30, 7 So. 193 (1889); State v.
Spaulding, 34 Minn. 361, 364, 25 N.W. 793 (1885).
136 People v. Motuzas, 352 Ill. 340, 185 N.E. 614 (1933); State v.
Shannon, 214 Iowa 1093, 243 N.W. 507 (1932).
13 Beasley v. State, 64 Miss. 518, 8 So. 234 (1886).
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of the important circumstances in the particular case. Such
an attack is less likely to be regarded as adequate provocation
than one that succeeds. But just as not every actual blow will
be sufficient for this purpose, so not every failure will leave it
insufficient. The unsuccessful attack may be so vicious in ex-
treme cases as to constitute adequate provocation. As said by
one court: "A wilful killing of a human being may be volun-
tary manslaughter rather than murder if it be provoked by...
an attempt to commit a serious personal injury upon the slayer
or by other equivalent circumstances calculated to excite sud-
den and uncontrollable passion."138
Adequate Provocation - Mutual Quarrel or Combat. A
wordy altercation will not of itself be sufficient to mitigate to
manslaughter a killing that is otherwise murder. 39 On the
other hand a mutual encounter which goes beyond words to
actual blows or to a manifestation of intent to use immediate
and violent force may constitute adequate provocation; 40 and
in determining the adequacy of the provocation in such a case
the entire quarrel, including the words, will be taken into con-
sideration.' 4 ' Several cautions are needed in this regard. (1)
If homicide results from force which was neither intended nor
likely to cause death or great bodily injury, it will not be mur-
der if no more than ordinary (non deadly) fight or struggle
was involved,'4 hence the problem of provocation does not
become important in such a situation. (2) Attack and defense
are not mutual. 43 If one person attacks another who defends
himself with no more force than he is privileged by law to use
for his own protection, there is no problem of provocation.
The assailant is acting without mitigation of any sort'4 and
the defender is fully justified or excused.l 5 (3) If an unlaw-
ful attack is resisted by force obviously in excess of what is
needed in self-defense, the case may or may not be within the
rule of provocation. There is no mitigation in favor of the
original assailant if he intended in the beginning to kill or to
inflict great bodily injury; 4 whereas if the original assailant
intended only a non-deadly scuffle the counter attack may be
so excessive as to constitute adequate provocation. 47 Whether
the original assault was of a deadly nature or not, it may be
'38 Swain v. State, 151 Ga. 375, 376-7, 107 S.E. 40 (1921).
'39 State v. Lee, 6 W. W. Harr. 11, 171 At. 195 (Del. 1933).
140 Richardson v. Commonwealth, 128 Va. 691, 104 S.E. 788 (1920).
'4' Regina v. Smith, 4 Fost. and F. 1066, 176 Eng. Rep. 910 (1866).
14 2 Lanier v. State, 31 Ala. App. 242, 15 So. 2d 278 (1943).
143 McDuffie v. State, 46 Ga. App. 691, 168 S.E. 910 (1933).
'44 Ballard v. Commonwealth, 156 Va. 980, 993-4, 159 S.E. 222
(1931).
145 Allen v. United States, 157 U. S. 675, 39 L. ed. 854, 15 Sup. Ct.
R. 720 (1895).
146 Murphy v. State, 37 Ala. 142, 146 (1861).
1V State v. Hill, 20 N. C. 518, 4 Dev. and Bat. 491 (1839).
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sufficient to constitute adequate provocation as far as the vic-
tim of the original assault is concerned.
Suppose, for example, two men were engaged in a tussle on a
vacant lot and one caused the death of the other. If it was a
friendly encounter - a mere test of strength without anger and
without intent to cause serious harm, it was not unlawful. And
if death resulted quite unexpectedly from such a struggle it
is no crime at all, but excusable homicide. If the facts were
the same except that the two were mutually engaged in an
angry fight - but without intent to cause death or great bodily
injury - and death should result quite unexpectedly to one,
the other would be guilty of manslaughter. 4 s This is not be-
cause of the rule of provocation but because the death resulted
from an unlawful, although apparently not dangerous, battery.
Such an accidental killing is not excused by the common law
because it tesulted from unlawful conduct characterized as
malum in se.14 This, it may be added, is the law in most of our
states today, although statutes in some states excuse an acciden-
tal killing in the heat of passion upon a sudden combat when
no undue advantage is taken, and no dangerous weapon used.150
If the struggle mentioned was an encounter in which one
had made an unlawful attack and the other was defending with
merely such force as he was privileged by law to employ for his
protection, and death should result quite unexpectedly from
force neither intended nor likely to cause death or great bodily
injury, the issue of crime would depend upon who survived.
If the assailant caused the death of his victim he would be
guilty of manslaughter, - death unexpectedly resulting from
an unlawful battery which was not intended or likely to pro-
duce such a result. If the innocent defender unexpectedly
caused the death of his assailant by force he was privileged to
use in his own defense, it is excusable homicide.
If the killing was intentional, or resulted from the use of
deadly force (force either intended or likely to cause death or
great bodily injury) then it may become important to consider
the question of provocation. If the two were engaged in a
mutual fight of an angry and unlawful nature the killing is
not excused but the blows inflicted upon the slayer in the en-
counter may be sufficient for adequate provocation. If one
unlawfully attacked the other, and killed him intentionally,
148 Kearns v. Commonwealth, 243 Ky. 745, 43 S.W. 2d 1009 (1932).
149 Regina v. Canniff, 9 Car. and P. 359, 173 Eng. Rep. 868 (1840).
But see Flourney v. State, 124 Tex. Cr. R. 395, 63 S.W. 2d 558 (1933).
The actual holding in the Texas case was that the facts did not consti-
tute an aggravated assault under the statutes of that state. See Tex.
Stats. (Vernon, 1936) Art. 1147.
150 See, for example, Cal. Pen. Code (Deering 1941) sec. 195; Miss.
Code, (1942) sec. 2219; Oreg. Comp. Laws (1940) sec. 3.23--418; Wis.
Stats. (1943) sec. 340.30.
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he is guilty of murder unless he had no intent to kill in the
beginning and the one assaulted struck back with force ob-
viously unnecessary for self-defense and greatly excessive in
view of the nature of the original attack. Such a counter at-
tack may be so obviously excessive as to constitute adequate
provocation, and if so the slayer, - although the original assail-
ant - is guilty of manslaughter rather than murder. 51 If the
victim of the assault killed his assailant under circumstances in
which he is not excused (because he used force obviously in
excess of that needed for his own defense) he is probably guilty
of manslaughter only because of the provocation, except that if
the "attack" was only a technical assault and battery which
neither caused nor threatened any serious pain or injury it
would be insufficient for adequate provocation and the killing
would be murder.
No killing is attributed to a sudden mutual combat if the
intent to kill or to inflict great bodily harm was formed prior
to the commencement of the encounter.152 If one by words or
acts provokes a difficulty for the purpose of killing the other,
or of doing him great bodily injury, and does kill the other in
carrying out his plan, he is guilty of murder.153 Whatever blows
he may receive from his adversary in such an encounter are
ignored as far as mitigation is concerned because his deadly
intent was formed before the blows were received. 54
Another matter requires special attention. One who is not
in any sense seeking an encounter, but has reason to fear an
unlawful attack upon his life, does not forfeit his privilege of
self-defense merely by arming himself in advance., 5 But one
who has reason to expect an encounter into which he will enter
as willingly as his adversary, and who secretly arms himself in
order to have an unfair advantage over the other during their
mutual combat, has given the matter entirely too much thought
to be entitled to the rule of mitigation recognized in certain
cases of killing in a sudden heat of passion.150 This is not to
be understood to exclude from mitigation every case in which
11 State v. Hill, 20 N. C. 518, 4 Dev. and Bat. 491 (1839). The
explanation is sometimes given in terms of a privilege of "imperfect
self-defense." Because of having entered the combat willingly he does
not have the privilege of perfect self-defense, which would exculpate
him entirely, but because he entered the fight with no intent to kill or
inflict great bodily injury and during the contest was required to kill
to save his own life, his act was within a privilege of "imperfect self-
defense," leaving him guilty of manslaughter rather than murder. Reed
v. State, 72 Tex. Cr. R. 103, 105, 161 S.W. 97 (1913).
152State v. Miller, 223 N. C. 184, 25 S.E. 2d 623 (1943).
153 State v. Flory, 40 Wyo. 184, 201, 276 Pac. 458 (1929).
'54Ballard v. Commonwealth, 156 Va. 980, 159 S.E. 222 (1931).
155 Allen v. United States, 157 U. S. 675, 39 L. ed. 854, 15 Sup. Ct.
R. 720 (1895); State v. Bristol, 53 Wyo. 304, 84 P. 2d 757 (1938).
156 Ex parte Nettles, 58 Ala. 268 (1877) ; State v. Hildreth, 31 N. C.
429 (1849); State v. McCants, 1 Speers 384 (S. C. 1843); Slaughter v.
Commonwealth, 11 Leigh 681 (Va. 1841).
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an unarmed fighter is killed with a deadly weapon. Heat of'
passion suddenly engendered by actual blows received in mu-
tual combat may be sufficient to reduce even such a homicide
to manslaughter. 57 The mere fact that when the quarrel be-
gan the slayer had a deadly weapon upon his person while the
other was not so armed is not alone sufficient to preclude the
possibility of mitigation,158 unless such a result is required by
some unusual statute.159 The question is whether or not the
slayer entered the combat with the intention of using this dan-
gerous instrument.160 Hence it is necessary to discriminate be-
tween the use of a deadly weapon procured beforehand for this
purpose, and the sudden angry use, in the heat of combat, of a
weapon which the slayer merely happened to have available at
the moment.' 6'
The fact that both participants have an unlawful intent to
kill will not be a mitigating circumstance for either if such
intent was not formed and acted upon suddenly in the heat of
combat.162 In "the case of a deliberate fight, such as a duel,
the slayer and his second are murderers."' Even he who acted
as second for the one vanquished in the duel has been held
guilty of murder. 64 The absence of seconds or other requisites
of the formal duel will not prevent the homicide from being
murder.165 Nor is it important, on the other hand, that the
duel was fairly conducted. 16 6  If sufficient time elapsed "be-
tween the quarrel and the 'going out to fight' to enable blood
to cool and passion to subside, the killing will be murder and
not manslaughter."' 67
A mere challenge to a fist fight by an unarmed man is not
sufficient to reduce an intentional killing to manslaughter.168
The same must be said of a threat to slap, made in the course
of a verbal dispute,169 and the further step of removing the
coat in preparation for fisticuffs. 7 0 Even an actual physical
contact during the course of a quarrel may be insufficient for
this purpose. In one case, for example, the deceased pushed
157 State v. Hoyt, 13 Minn. 132, 149 (1868).
158 Gourks v. United States, 153 U. S. 183, 38 L. ed. 680, 14 Sup. Ct.
R. 806 (1894).
'59 It was held that the Alabama statute required a conviction of
murder where the killing was in a sudden affray, by means of a weapon
concealed before the fight started, if the deceased had no deadly weapon
drawn. Caldwell v. State, 203 Ala. 412, 84 So. 272 (1919).
160 Rivers v. State, 75 Fla. 401, 78 So. 343 (1918).
161 State v. Barnwell, 80 N. C. 466 (1879).
162 Strong v. State, 85 Ark. 536, 109 S.W. 536 (1908).
163 State v. Rhodes, Roust. Cr. R. 476, 497 (Del. 1877).
164 Regina v. Barronet, Dears 51, 169 Eng. Rep. 633 (1852).
165 Thomas v. State, 61 Miss. 60, 66 (1883); Bundrick v. State, 125
Ga. 753, 54 S.E. 683 (1906).
166 Regina v. Barronet, supra f.n. 164.
167People v. Sanchez, 24 Cal. 17, 27 (1864).
165Slaughter v. Commonwealth, 11 Leigh 681 (Va. 1841).
169Ballard v. Commonwealth, 156 Va. 980, 159 S.E. 222 (1931).
170State v. Doherty, 72 Vt. 381, 48 At. 658 (1900).
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one of two persons with whom he was quarreling, whereupon
they stabbed him to death with a knife. This homicide was
held to be murder because the "provocation given by the de-
ceased was but slight, and in the progress of the fight, the pris-
oners used an excess of violence, out of all proportion to the
provocation."'171
If the fight is really "mutual" in the sense that both enter
into it willingly, as distinguished from the case in which one
is clearly attacking and the other merely defending; if the in-
tent to kill or to inflict great bodily injury is formed in the
heat of the encounter, rather than in advance, and the slayer
does not deliberately take unfair advantage of the other by
secretly arming himself with a weapon to have ready "just in
case;" and if the encounter reaches the proportion of actual
physical contact, or dangerous threat of serious and immedi-
ate harm, sufficient to arouse the passions of the ordinary rea-
sonable man, the law takes the position that in such mutual
combat there is mutual provocation. 72 The combat is mutual
if the intent to fight is mutual,'73 and in such situations the
question of which one actually strikes the first blow is not
controlling.'74 In fact, if both intend to fight and are ready to
do so it may be a "mutual combat" although one party did not
actually strike any blow.1T5
Adequate Provocation - Words. Well established in the
common law is the rule that provocative words are not recog-
nized as adequate provocation to reduce a wilful killing to
murder, however abusive, 1' 6 aggravating, 71 contemptuous,' 78
false,1'7 9 grievous,8 0 indecent,' 8 ' insulting, 8 2 opprobrious,183
provoking, 8 4 or scurrilous'8 5 they may be. Actual cases afford
extreme illustrations.
In 1666 it was said: "If one calls another son of a whore and
giveth him the lie, and upon those words the other kill him
that gave the words, this notwithstanding those words, is mur-
' 7 State v. Gooch, 94 N. C. 987, 1014 (1886).
172State v. Green, Houst. Cr. R. 217 (Del. 1866).
173 McDuffie v. State, 46 Ga. App. 691, 168 S.E. 910 (1933).
174Hall v. State, 177 Ga. 794, 171 S.E. 274, 279 (1933); State v.
Kennedy, 169 N. C. 288, 292, 84 S.E. 515 (1915).
175 Roberts v. State, 189 Ga. 36, 44, 5 S.E. 2d 340 (1940).
176 State v. Hardisty, 122 Kan. 527, 529, 253 Pac. 615 (1927).
177 Allen v. United States, 164 U. S. 492, 497, 41 L. ed. 528, 17 Sup.
Ct. R. 154 (1896).
178 State v. White, 81 W. Va. 516, 519, 94 S.E. 972 (1918).
170 Commonwealth v. Gelfi, 282 Pa. 434, 439-40, 128 AtI. 77 (1925).
180 State v. Elliott, 90 Mo. 350, 355 (1886).
181 State v. Trujillo, 27 N. M. 594, 597, 203 Pac. 846 (1921).
182 Coleman v. State, 149 Ga. 186, 188, 99 S.E. 627 (1919).
183 State v. Levelle, 34 S. C. 120, 129, 13 S.E. 319 (1890).
ls4People v. Russell, 322 Ill. 295, 301, 153 N.E. 389 (1926).
185State v. Nevares, 36 N. M. 41, 44, 7 P. 2d 933 (1932).
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der. . . . "181 And modern cases involving equally vile epithets
have reached the same conclusion.181
There have been a few rare instances in which some court
has questioned the soundness of this rule as to provocative
words. 88 Even rarer instances of actual legislative modifica-
tion exist, such as the former Texas statute to the effect that
"insulting words or conduct of the person killed toward a fe-
male relation of the party killing"'' 89 were "adequate cause" to
reduce a voluntary homicide to manslaughter. 190 There is also
the more recent legislative action in that state repealing its
general provision dealing with words or gestures, - as judi-
cially interpreted.191 For the most part, however, it has been
held with remarkable uniformity that even words generally
regarded as "fighting words" in the community have no recog-
nition as adequate provocation in the eyes of the law. 92 Ade-
quate provocation may sometimes be established by a combi-
nation of insulting words with some other circumstance which
would not of itself be sufficient. For example, insulting words
plus a blow too slight for provocation in itself may together
constitute adequate provocation; 19 3 and the same is true of in-
sulting words plus an aggravated trespass to property.194
Insulting words, let it be added by way of caution, may be
considered in determining the degree of murder,195 or in as-
sessing the punishment for murder 98 if the law provides more
than one possible penalty.
Under the sound rule, recognized by most courts, 197 infor-
mational words are placed upon a different footing than in-
'
8s1Huggett's Case, Kelying 59, 60, 84 Eng. Rep. 1082 (1666).
187 "Liar," Brown v. State, 175 Ga. 329, 337, 165 S.E. 252 (1932);
"S-.- of B-," Harrison v. State, 18 Okia. Cr. R. 403, 408, 195 Pac. 511(1921); "G- D- bastard," Barrett v. State, 98 Tex. Cr. R. 627, 267
S.W. 511 (1925).
188 Commonwealth v. Hourigan, 89 Ky. 305, 313, 12 S.W. 550 (1889);
State v. Jarrott, 23 N. C. 76, 82 (1840); Seals v. State, 62 Tenn. 459
(1874). But compare Sawyers v. Commonwealth, 18 Ky. L. Rep. 6.57,
38 S.W. 136 (1896); State v. McNeill, 92 N. C. 812, 816-7 (1885);
Freddo v. State, 127 Tenn. 376, 155 S.W. 170 (1912).
189 Tex. Rev. Crim. Stats. (1925) sec. 1248. Repealed by Acts of
40th Legislature (1927) ch. 274.
190 Ibid. sec. 1244. Repealed in 1927.
191 Repeal of the statute declaring that words or gestures alone
were not adequate cause for sudden passion reducing homicide to mur-
der without malice held to manifest an intent that insulting words or
gestures might be sufficient to constitute "adequate cause." Elsmore v.
State, 132 Tex. Cr. R. 261, 104 S.W. 2d 493 (1937).
192 See supra f.n. 176-186.
193 Lamp v. State, 38 Ga. App. 36, 37, 142 S.E. 202 (1928).
194 State v. Davis, 34 S.W. 2d 133 (Mo. 1930).
195 State v. Williams, 186 Mo. 128, 84 S.W. 924 (1904); State v.
Robinson, Mo. ... , 185 S.W. 2d 636 (1945).
196Kiersey v. State, 131 Ark. 487, 491, 199 S.W. 532 (1917).
197 Georgia has held that under the statute in that state the wife's
sudden confession of adultery will not reduce the husband's act of kill-
ing her to manslaughter. Humphreys v. State, 175 Ga. 705, 165 S.E.
733 (1932).
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suiting words' 9 s The sound theory is that it is the fact, or al-
leged fact, which really constitutes the adequate provocation,
but the sudden disclosure of the fact may have the same effect
as if it had just happened. Thus an intentional killing may
be manslaughter only if the deceased had just told the slayer
that he had raped the latter's wife99 or had committed adultery
with her,200 or had ravished the latter's young daughter,20' or
committed a serious battery upon his child.20 2 To satisfy the
requirement of suddenness, to be considered presently, it is
necessary for mitigation in such a case that the slayer should
not have previously acquired the information from some other
source.2 03 On the other hand, if the slayer is told of such great
harm which he had not heard of before, this may be sufficient
for adequate, provocation (according to most courts) even if
the statement is untrue - provided it is made under circum-
stances calculated to cause it to be believed and it is actually
believed by the slayer.20 4 This is merely a particular applica-
tion of the reasonable mistake of fact doctrine.
Adequate Provocation - Gestures. Insulting gestures alone
are not adequate provocation. 205 Gestures indicating an intent
to attack with deadly force will be adequate provocation in a
mutual encounter,20 6 and under other circumstances may com-
pletely justify or excuse a homicide under the self-defense
privilege.20 7
Adequate Provocation - Trespass. If the force used is privi-
leged under the circumstances, no problem of provocation is
involved because no crime is committed even if death results.
Hence discussions of trespass as constituting, or not constitut-
ing, adequate provocation presuppose a use of force beyond
that authorized by law. A purely technical trespass, even in
the dwelling house, will not be recognized as sufficient for this
purpose; 208 but it is clearly recognized that a trespass in or upon
the dwelling, may be of a nature insufficient to authorize the
use of deadly force, and yet sufficiently aggravating to consti-
tute adequate provocation.20 9 It is often stated that no tres-
pass will of itself amount to adequate provocation if it is not in
or upon the dwelling house and does not involve any personal
198 Regina v. Rothwell, 12 Cox C. C. 145, 147 (1871).
'99 State v. Flory, 40 Wyo. 184, 276 Pac. 458 (1929).
200 Davis v. State, 161 Tenn. 23, 28 S.W. 2d 993 (1930).
201 State v. Grugin, 147 Mo. 39, 47 S.W. 1058 (1898).
202 People 'v. Rice, 351 Ill. 604, 184 N.E. 894 (1933).
203 State v. Grugin, 147 Mo. 39, 47 S.W. 1058 (1898). Compare
State v. P?ivett, 175 Mo. 207, 75 S.W. 457 (1903).
204 State v. Yantz, 74 Conn. 177, 181, 50 At. 37 (1901).
205 State v. Lee, 6 W. W. Harr. 11, 171 Atl. 195, 199 (Del. 1933).
206Hall v. State, 177 Ga. 794, 171 S.E. 274, 279 (1933).
207 State v. Mason, 115 S. C. 214, 217, 105 S.E. 286 (1920).2 0 8 Carroll v. State, 23 Ala. 28, 36 (1853).
209 State ,v. Adams, 78 Iowa 292, 43 N.W. 194 (1889); State v.
Welch, 37 N. M. 549, 25 P. 2d 211 (1933).
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danger to the slayer.2 10 The Georgia court spoke with com-
mendable caution in referring to this as true "generally" and
indicating the possibility of exceptions in cases of such tres-
passes more highly provoking in their nature than any yet in-
volved in adjudicated cases.211 And the Missouri court has
held that tearing down a man's fence may be under circum-
stances sufficiently provocative to reduce a killing to man-
slaughter.212
Adequate Provocation - Other Acts. An unlawful arrest,
or an attempted arrest, may be under circumstances sufficient
to constitute adequate provocation;213 but the mere fact that
the apprehension is beyond the actual authority of law will
not necessarily produce this result.21 4 Certain outrageous acts
are very generally recognized as adequate provocation. In this
list may be included, without attempting to exhaust the list,
(1) adultery215 (2) seduction of the slayer's infant daugh-
ter,216 (3) rape of the slayer's wife217 or close female relative,2s
(4) murder or other felonious injury inflicted upon a close
relative of the slayer.2 19 In a few jurisdictions there are stat-
utes, going beyond anything recognized by common law,220 de-
claring homicide to be justifiable if committed in the sudden
heat of passion engendered by certain extremely provocative
misdeeds, such as the defilement or attempted rape of the slay-
er's wife or close female relative.22 1
Heat of Passion. To be within the rule of provocation the
slayer must have killed the deceased in the heat of passion. In
210 See State v. Naylor, 28 Del. (5 Boyce) 99, 90 Atl. 88 (1914);
Atkinson v. State, 137 Miss. 42, 101 So. 490 (1924).211 Hayes v. State, 58 Ga. 35, 47 (1877).
212 State v. Matthews, 148 Mo. 185, 49 S.W. 1085 (1898). See also
State v. Reed, 154 Mo. 122, 55 S.W. 278 (1899).
213 people v. White, 333 Ill. 512, 165 N.E. 168 (1929).
214 Galvin v. State, 46 Tenn. 283 (1869).
215 Manning's Case, T. Raym, 212, 83 Eng. Rep. 112 (1671); Crow-
der v. State, 18 Ala. App. 632, 93 So. 338 (1922); Sheppard v. State,
243 Ala. 498, 10 So. 2d 822 (1942).
216 Toler v. State, 152 Tenn. 1, 260 S.W. 134 (1923).
217 State v. Flory, 40 Wyo. 184, 276 Pac. 458 (1929).
218 State v. Cooper, 112 La. 281, 36 So. 350 (1904).
219 People v. Rice, 351 Ill. 604, 184 N.E. 894 (1933).
220 "It is well established law that no provocation whatever can ren-
der homicide justifiable or excusable. It can only reduce it to man-
slaughter." Commonwealth v. Beverly, 237 Ky. 35, 34 S.W. 2d 941(1931).
221 See, for example, Utah Code (1943) sec. 103-28-10. And see
People v. Halliday, 5 Utah 467, 17 Pac. 118 (1888).
"Homicide is justifiable when committed by the husband upon one
taken in the act of adultery with the wife, provided the killing take place
before the parties have separated...." Tex. Pen. Code (Vernon, 1936)
art. 1220.
This will not justify the husband in killing his wife, caught in the
act of adultery. Jordan v. State, 107 Tex. Cr. R. 137, 294 S.W. 1109
(1927). And by emphasis upon the exact wording of the statute it was
held not to justify the wife in killing a woman committing adultery with
the slayer's husband. Reed v. State, 123 Tex. Cr. R. 348, 59 S.W. 2d
122 (1933); Barr v. State, 146 Tex. Cr. R. 178, 172 S.W. 2d (1943).
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speaking of the previous requirement it was mentioned that in
determining whether or not there was adequate provocation
an objective test is used: would what was done have inflamed
the passions of the ordinary reasonable man? But the present
requirement is measured by a subjective test; it depends upon
the actual state of mind of the slayer at the moment of the
fatal act. The question here is not what would have been the
state of mind of someone else, but did the slayer kill in the
actual heat of passion? 22 As frequently stated by the courts,
neither adequate provocation without passion nor passion with-
out adequate provocation will be sufficient to reduce volun-
tary homicide to manslaughter. 223
To constitute the heat of passion included in this require-
ment it is not necessary for the passion to be so extreme that
the slayer does not know what he is doing at the time;224 but it
must be so extreme that for the moment his action is being
directed by passion rather than by reason.2 5  In this connec-
tion it is essential to keep in mind the statutory change in a
few states whereby all intentional homicide is murder if not
justifiable or excusable. 2 6  Under such legislation the killing
would be murder in spite of the heat of passion engendered
by adequate provocation, unless the killing was unintended
in the ordinary sense or was by one so inflamed by passion as
not to know what he was doing.
Sudden - The Cooling Time. No matter how extreme the
provocation, or how great the passion engendered thereby, there
will be no mitigation sufficient to reduce voluntary homicide
to manslaughter in the absence of another requirement. The
killing must have been in a sudden beat of passion. That is,
the fatal act must have followed the provocation before there
222 Green v. State, 195 Ga. 759, 25 S.E. 2d 502 (1943).
"On the other hand, a killing upon provocation ordinarily calculated
to excite the passion beyond control, would not make the killing volun-
tary manslaughter if the provocation did not, in fact, produce the sud-
den heat of passion, which is an essential ingredient of the offense."
Cavanaugh v. Commonwealth, 172 Ky. 799, 805, 190 S.W. 123 (1916).
223 Vance v. State, 70 Ark. 272, 278, 68 S.W. 37 (1902).
224 "We nowhere find that the passion which in law rebuts the im-
putation of malice, must be so overpowering as for the time to shut out
knowledge and destroy volition." State v. Hill, 20 N. C. 518, 522-3, 4
Dev. and Bat. 491, 496 (1939).
It is incorrect to say no authority can be found for such a position.
See, for example, State v. Anderson, 2 Overt. 6, 8 (Tenn. 1804), sug-
gesting that the passion must be so great as to produce a temporary
loss of reason. And see Sanders v. State, 26 Ga. App. 475, 478, 106 S.E.
314 (1921), in which the court speaks of a "sudden violent impulse of
passion supposed to be irresistible." But the sound view of the common
law is as stated in the text. People v. Freel, 48 Cal. 436, 437 (1874);
Commonwealth v. Demboski, 283 Mass. 315, 186 S.E. 589 (1933); Dye V.State, 127 Miss. 492, 90 So. 180 (1921).
225 Smith v. State, 83 Ala. 26, 28, 3 S.E. 11 (1887) ; Commonwealth
v. Wucherer, 351 Pa. 305, 41A. 2d 574 (1945); Hannah v. Common-
wealth, 153 Va. 863, 870, 149 S.E. 419 (1929).
220 See, for example, Ohio Gen. Code (Page, 1939) sees. 12400-
12403; Jones v. State, 51 Ohio St. 331, 38 N.E. 79 (1894).
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had been a reasonable opportunity for the passion of the slayer
to cool.2
7
This, like the adequacy of the provocation itself, is measured
by an objective test. Whether or not there was a reasonable
opportunity for the passion to cool, depends upon whether or
not, under all of the circumstances of the particular case,m
there has been such a lapse of time since the provocation was
received that the mind of the ordinary reasonable man would
have cooled sufficiently so that action once more would be di-
rected by reason rather than by passion.229 If such time has
elapsed before the fatal act the slayer does not have the bene-
fit of the rule of provocation even if his own mind is still in-
flamed by passion at the time of the killing. 0 He is guilty of
murder in such a case.
Requirement number two must not be forgotten in the con-
sideration of number three. If the passion of the slayer actually
had cooled at the time of the killing it was homicide with mal-
ice aforethought and hence murder, however short the time
may have been, and however much might have been the con-
tinued passion of the ordinary reasonable man. In one case,
for example, in which the killing took place within a very few
moments of the provocation, there was evidence to show an
attempted telephone call by the slayer in the interim. He was
trying to reach the sheriff; and this incident, said the court,
showed the most rational and reasonable state of mind, en-
tirely inconsistent with the theory of overpowering excite-
ment.231 This particular individual had unusual control over
his passions, but the law would not treat a cold-blooded killing
as one committed in the sudden heat of passion. As said by
another court in a leading case: "If in fact the defendant's pas-
sions did cool, which may be shown by such circumstances as
the transaction of other business in the meantime, rational con-
versation upon other subjects, evidence of the preparation for
the killing, etc., then the length of time intervening is imma-
terial."23 2
In certain other cases the killer has had less than the usual
control over his passions and has been deprived of the benefit
of the rule of provocation because the cooling time had passed
227 Sanders -v. State, 26 Ga. App. 475, 478, 106 S.E. 314 (1921);
State v. Farris, 6 S.W. 2d 903 (Mo. 1928).
228 State v. Robinson, Mo. ... , 185 S.W. 2d, 636 (1945).
M9 "If such an interval of time elapsed between the provocation and
the killing as is reasonably sufficient for reason to resume its sway, the
act is not mitigated to manslaughter." State v. Agnesi, 92 N.J.L. 53,
104 Atl. 299 (1918). Aff'd, 92 N. J. L. 638, 106 Atl. 893, 108 Atl. 115
(1918).
230 State v. Robinson, .. Mo. ... , 185 S.W. 2d 686 (1945).
231 State v. Delbrcno, 306 Mo. 553, 268 S.W. 60 (1924).
232 Be Fraley, 3 Okla. Cr. R. 719, 109 Pac. 295 (1910).
THE LAW OF HOMICIDE
although his passions were still inflamed. 23 3 There is no incon-
sistency between such cases because the second requirement is
measured by an objective test and the third by a subjective
test, and one accused of murder must satisfy both (as well as
the first and the fourth), in order to prove that his crime is
only manslaughter.234
There is no simple rule of thumb by which to measure the
length of the cooling time in terms of so many hours or min-
utes. It varies according to the circumstances of each particu-
lar case.23 5 The greater the provocation, the longer will be the
cooling time.236 It may also be affected by other factors. For
example, if the provoker should flee immediately after the pro-
voking act, and should be pursued for a considerable distance
before being overtaken *and killed, the very chase itself would
tend to keep the passion inflamed - at least for a longer period
than if no chase were involved. If the period is very short237
or very long2 38 the court will instruct the jury as a matter of
law that there was no time for the passion to cool, or that there
was adequate time for this purpose, as the fact may be; but
ordinarily when this problem arises in a case it is left to the
jury with an instruction for them to find as a fact whether the
fatal act followed the provocation before the lapse of such time
that the mind of the ordinary reasonable man, under all of the
circumstances of the case at hand, would have cooled sufficient-
ly for his conduct to be directed by reason rather than pas-
sion.23 9
It is the lapse of the cooling time which prevents the recog-
nition of any mitigation where the fatal act resulted from a
formal duel, and what was said in that regard under the head
of "mutual quarrel or combat" might have been reserved for
this subdivision.
Causal Connection Between Provocation, Passion, and Fatal
Act. In addition to the three requirements mentioned above
it is necessary that they exist, not by coincidence, but by direct
causal relation. The adequate provocation must have engen-
dered the heat of passion,24 and the heat of passion must have
been the cause of the act which resulted in death.241 There is
233 People v. Sanchez, 24 Calif. 17, 27 (1864); State v. Farris, 6
S.W. 2d 903 (Mo. 1928).
234 If the prisoner's passion did actually cool or there was reasonable
time for cooling,--in either situation, the mitigating effect of the provo-
cation is lost. State v. McCants, 1 Spears 384, 388 (S. C. 1843).
235State v. Rosa, 87 Conn. 585, 89 Atl. 163 (1913).
236 State v. Connor, 252 S.W. 713 (Mo. 1923).
237 State v. Yarbrough, 8 N. C. (1 Hawks) 78 (1820).23
8Re Fraley, 3 Okla. Cr. R. 719, 109 Pac. 295 (1910).
239 The question is whether the interval was sufficient "to permit
the passions to cool and to allow thought and reflection and reason to
reassert itself." State v. Lee, 6 W. W. Harr. 11, 171 Atl. 195 (Del.
1933).
240 State v. Sloan, 22 Mont. 293, 56 Pac. 364 (1899).241 ReX v. Thomas, 7 Car. and P. 817, 819, 173 Eng. Rep. 356 (1837).
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no mitigation, for example, if the intent to kill was formed
before the provocation was received (unless such intent had
been definitely abandoned by a change of mind) because in
such a case the provocation, no matter how adequate, was not
the cause of the fatal act. 242
Killing Innocent Bystander. Additional light may be thrown
upon this subject by reference to an exceptional situation. If
one who has received adequate provocation is so enraged that
he intentionally vents his wrath upon an innocent bystander,
causing his death, he will be guilty of murder;242 but if his
deadly force was directed at the provoker and hit the other by
accident, 44 or if as a reasonable mistake of fact he thought the
provocative act had been perpetrated by the deceased,245 he is
guilty of manslaughter only, if he otherwise meets the require-
ments of the rule of provocation.
Mitigation Other Than Provocation. Since manslaughter is
a "catch-all" concept, covering all homicides which are neither
murder nor innocent, it logically includes some killings in-
volving other types of mitigation, and such is the rule of the
common law. For example, if one man kills another inten-
tionally, under circumstances beyond the scope of innocent
homicide, the facts may come so close to justification or excuse
that the killing will be classed as voluntary manslaughter
rather than murder. "It is not always necessary to show that
the killing was done in the heat of passion, to reduce the crime
to manslaughter;" said the Arkansas court, "for, where the
killing was done because the slayer believes that he is in great
danger, but the facts do not warrant such a belief, it may be
murder or manslaughter according to the circumstances, even
though there be no passion."2 46 To give another illustration,
the intentional taking of human life to prevent crime may fall
a little short of complete justification or excuse and still be
without malice aforethought.247 Here also is the possibility of
change by statute, - a matter not to be ignored at any point in
criminal law, particularly in the field of manslaughter. For
example, some legislative enactments have spoken of voluntary
manslaughter in terms only of a killing in "a sudden heat of
passion caused by a provocation" and so forth.248 Such restric-
242 State v. Johnson, 23 N. C. 354 (1840).
243 State v. Vinso, 171 Mo. 576, 71 S.W. 1034 (1902).244 Wheatley v. Commnwealth, 26 Ky. L. Rep. 436, 81 S.W. 687
(1904).245 White v. State, 44 Tex. Cr. R. 346, 72 S.W. 173 (1902).
246Allison v. State, 74 Ark. 444, 453-4, 86 S.W. 409 (1905). Simi-
lar language appears in Freeman v. State, 174 Ark. 1035, 1039, 298 S.W.
333 (1927). And see Deatherage v. State, 194 Ark. 513, 108 S.W. 2d
904 (1937).
247 Commonwealth v. Beverly, 237 Ky. 35, 34 S.W. 2d 941 (1931);
Williams v. State, 127 Miss. 851, 90 So. 705 (1921).24
8Ariz. Rev. Code (Off., 1939) sec. 43-2904. For differently
worded statutes which also seem to limit voluntary manslaughter unduly,
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tion is probably unintentional, being attributable to the fact
that this is by far the most common type of mitigation; but it
is very unfortunate.
(2): INVOLUNTARY MANSLAUGHTER
Involuntary manslaughter is a "catch-all" concept. It in-
cludes all manslaughter not characterized as voluntary. The
trend of the case law, where not hampered by statute, has been
to include within "voluntary manslaughter" certain uninten-
tional killings, - that is, it includes all homicides whether in-
tentional or unintentional which are committed with a man-
endangering-state-of-mind and are not justified or excused but
are perpetrated under circumstances of recognized mitigation.
And since manslaughter itself is a "catch-all" concept, includ-
ing as a matter of common law all homicide not amounting
to murder on the one hand and not legally justifiable or ex-
cusable on the other, the general outline of involuntary man-
slaughter is very simple. Every unintentional killing of a hu-
man being is involuntary manslaughter if it is neither murder
nor voluntary manslaughter nor within the scope of some rec-
ognized justification or excuse. Furthermore, any exculpatory
factor in case of such a homicide is almost certain to be a mat-
ter of excuse rather than of justification. If the killing had-
been either commanded by the state or authorized by it in some
emergency such as a proper case of self-defense, the killing
would have been intentional in all probability. Stated the
other way, an unintentional killing is seldom one that has been
commanded or authorized by the state; and a homicide not
commanded or authorized by the state is not justified, in the
true sense of the word, although it may perhaps be excused.
Part of the boundary line of this "catch-all" concept having
been dealt with in the consideration of malice aforethought
and of voluntary manslaughter, it is necessary at this point to
take up the factors which determine whether homicide is or is
not excusable. Where loss of life has neither been intended
nor the result of any other sort of man-endangering-state-of-
mind, the killing will be excused if he who caused it was not
engaged in any unlawful activity at the time and was free from
negligence.249 Homicide is excusable, as far as the common
law of crimes is concerned, in some cases in which the slayer
was not as fully free from fault as indicated by such a state-
ment. This requires separate attention to killings resulting
from (a) an unlawful act and (b) negligence.
see, for example: Cal. Pen. Code (Deering, 1941) see. 192; Idaho Code
(1932) see. 17-1106; Utah Code (1943) see. 103-28-5. Compare Colo.
Ann. Stats. (1935) see. 43-2904.249 Commonwealth -v. Flax, 331 Pa. 145, 200 AtI. 632 (1938).
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Homicide by Unlawful Act. If homicide by one engaged in
an unlawful act were regarded as never excusable the law
would be simpler than it is, - and more severe. The common
law, in spite of statements suggesting such a simple and severe
rule,250 recognizes certain exceptions based upon (1) the na-
ture of the unlawful act and (2) the absence of causal connec-
tion between the unlawful act and the death. Each of these
matters requires attention.
The Nature of the Unlawful Act. It has been common to
define manslaughter in terms of "unlawful homicide" or "un-
lawful killing. '251 This is entirely proper if sufficient empha-
sis is placed upon the conjunction of the two -words. The homi-
cide without malice aforethought which constitutes man-
slaughter is one in connection with which there is found not
"unlawfulness" and "killing," but "unlawful killing." The
word "unlawful" is used in different senses, being broad
enough at times to include what is "unpermitted but not nec-
essarily forbidden." 252 The phrase "unlawful act" is employed
at times in a sense broad enough to include a deed wrongful
only in the sense that it will support a civil action for dam-
ages. 253 This usage has no place in the common law of man-
slaughter, although a few statutes have included a part of this
field.254 In fact, common law references to homicide resulting
from an unlawful act as being utterly beyond the realm of ex-
cuse, employ the phrase in a sense narrow enough to exclude
a portion of the public offense field. In one case, for example,
a man drove his team of mules through a toll gate, urging them
forward in an attempt to avoid the payment of the toll. The
team became unmanageable and ran over the keeper of the
gate, thus causing his death. The driver was tried on the theory
that he was guilty of manslaughter if the death was due to his
unlawful attempt to pass through the gate without paying,
whether the act was done in a careless manner or not. In re-
versing a conviction the court said: "There mere unlawfulness
of the act does not in this class of cases, per se render the doer
of it liable in criminal law for all the undesigned and improb"
250 For example, see some of the language of the court in Jarich v.
People, 58 Colo. 175, 179, 143 Pac. 1092, 1094 (1914); State v. Brown,
S. C. ... , 32 S.E. 2d 825, 828 (1945).25 1Paramore v. State, 161 Ga. 166, 178, 129 S.E. 772 (1925) ; State
v. Pond, 125 Me. 453, 455, 134 Atl. 572 (1926).
252 Ballentine, James A., College Law Dictionary, Rochester, N. Y.,
The Lawyers Co-Operative Publishing Co., 1931.253 Dunbar v. American T. and T. Co., 238 Ill. 456, 485, 87 N.E. 520
(1909). And see the reference to "an unlawful act not criminal" and
"means which were unlawful though not criminal." State v. Hardin,
144 Iowa 264, 267, 120 N.W. 470 (1909).
254 New York, for example, includes in second degree murder, an
unintentional killing "by a person committing or attempting to commit
a trespass, or other invasion of a private right, either of the person
killed or another, not amounting to a crime." N. Y. Pen. Law (Gilbert,
1943) sec. 1052.
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able consequences of it" because the act itself was malum pro-
hibitum only.255
Here we have the key to this compartment of the common
law. While the boundary line has not yet been clearly marked
it has been found necessary to distinguish between two types
of public offenses. Sometimes the differentiation has been be-
tween "civil offenses" 256 or "public torts"257 on the one hand
and "true crimes" 25 on the other; but the traditional classifica-
tion is between offenses mala prohibita and offenses mala in
se.259 "Acts mala in se," it has been said, "include, in addition
to all felonies, all breaches of the public order, injuries to per-
son and property, outrages upon public decency and morals,
and breaches of official duty when done wilfully or corruptly.
Acts mala prohibita include any matter forbidden or com-
manded by statute, but not otherwise wrong." 260 Death result-
ing from an offense malum in se is not excusable, but is man-
slaughter 261 (if not murder) in the absence of some special stat-
utory excuse,262 even if no substantial element of human risk
seemed to be involved.2 0 For example, while accidental death
resulting from a lawful boxing match is excusable 26 4 a loss of
life will not be less than manslaughter if it occurred under cir-
cumstances otherwise the same but in a prize fight in a juris-
diction in which prize fighting is unlawful. 265 The reason is
'that each blow in a forbidden prize fight is an assault and bat-
tery and death resulting from assault and battery (malum in
se) is manslaughter,268 if not murder. Furthermore, since an
unlawful attempt to procure an abortion is malum in se, a
death resulting from such an attempt will not be less than man-
2 55 Eatell v. State, 51 N. J. L. 182, 185, 17 AtI. 118 (1889).
256 Legislation, Criminal Law-Reclassification of Certain Offenses
as Civil Instead of Criminal (1937) 12 Wis. L. Rev.. 365.
257 May's Law of Crimes, Sears, Kenneth C. and Weihofen, Henry,
Boston, Little, Brown and Co. 4th ed. (1938) sec. 10.
258 Sayre, Francis Bowes, Public Welfare Offenses (1938) 33 Col.
L. Rev. 55, 84.
259 State v. Kellison, 233 Iowa 1274, 11 N.W. 2d 371 (1943).
2 6 0 Commonwealth v. Adams, 114 Mass. 323, 324 (1873).
261 State v. Kellison, 233 Iowa 1274, 11 N.W. 2d 371 (1943).
262 Killing is excused if "in the heat of passion, upon any sudden
and sufficient provocation, or upon a sudden combat provided that no
undue advantage is taken nor any dangerous weapon used, and that the
killing is not done in a cruel and unusual manner." Okla. Stats. (1941),
tit. 21, sec. 731.263 Regina v. Porter, 12 Cox C. C. 444 (1873); State v. Weisengoff,
85 W. Va. 271, 101 S.E. 450 (1919).
2 64 Regina v. Young, 10 Cox C. C. 371 (1866).
265 People v. Fitzsimmons, 34 N. Y. Supp. 1102 (1895).
266 Salter v. State, 22 Ala. App. 86, 112 So. 538 (1927) ; Jackson v.
State, 69 Ga. App. 707, 26 S.E. 2d 485 (1943); Commonwealth v. Gricus,
317 Mass. 403, 58 N.E. 2d 241 (1944); State v. Johnson, 102 Ind. 247,
1 N.E. 297 (1885). But see the statement in Flourney v. State, 124
Tex. Cr. R. 395, 63 S.W. 2d 588 (1933). The victim died, but the issue
in the case was between aggravated assault and battery and simple as-
sault and battery.
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slaughter267 no matter how much skill was employed.2 68 Death
resulting from an offense malum prohibitum is excusable if
neither wilful nor the result of criminal negligence.269 The vio-
lation of law is not ignored in such a case. It is one of the fac-
tors to be considered by the jury in determining whether or not
defendant's conduct amounted to criminal negligence.270 The
violation of a statute enacted for the safety of persons and
property may be negligence per se;271 but it does not constitute
criminal negligence per se.272 Such a violation is sometimes
made prima facie evidence of negligence by statute; 273 but it is
still necessary for the jury to determine whether or not, under
all of the circumstances of the particular case, it amounted to
criminal negligence.27 4 Even an intentional violation of such
a statute does not constitute criminal negligence per se,275 al-
though cases can be found holding an intentional violation of
the speed law sufficient to constitute such negligence.2 76  It is
generally held that driving an automobile on the highway
while intoxicated is a criminally negligent act;277 but it is pos-
sible to find authority the other way.278
Leaving aside the problem of criminal negligence, a matter
to receive additional attention later, the rule may be summed
up in this form: Homicide resulting from an unlawful act
malum prohibitum may be found to be excusable under all
the facts of the particular case; but homicide resulting from an
act malum in se cannot be less than manslaughter. This in-
vites attention to the causal relation between the unlawful act
and the death.
Causal Relation Between Unlawful Act and Death. It has
not been uncommon to speak of this branch of involuntary
267 People v. Rongetti, 338 Ill. 56, 170 N.E. 14 (1930); State V. Wal-
ters, 199 Wis. 68, 225 N.W. 167 (1929).
268 Worthington v. State, 92 Md. 222, 48 AtI. 335 (1901).
269 State v. Horton, 139 N. C. 588, 51 S.E. 945 (1905). In this, one
of the leading cases in the manslaughter field, death was caused by one
hunting on enclosed land of another without the written permission of
the owner as required by statute. The jury by special verdict found
that hunting on this land was not dangerous in itself and that defendant
was not negligent in firing the fatal shot. The killing was held not
manslaughter but excusable homicide.27 0Minardo v. State, 204 Ind. 422, 183 N.E. 548 (1932); Benton v.
State, 124 'Neb. 485, 247 N.W. 21 (1933); State v. Thatcher, Utah...,
157 P. 2d 258, 261 (1945).
271 City Ice Delivery Co. v. Lecari, 210 Ala. 69, 98 So. 90 (1924);
Kisling v. Thierman, 214 Iowa 911, 243 N.W. 552 (1932).
272 State v. Barnes, 182 Mich. 179, 148 N.W. 400 (1914); State v.
Cope, 204 N. C. 28, 167 S.E. 456 (1933).
273 People v. Toohey, 319 Ill. 113, 149 N.E. 795 (1925).
274 People v. Falkovitch, 280 Ill. 321, 117 N.E. 398 (1917).
275 Thompson v. State, 108 Fla. 370, 146 So. 201 (1933); Benton v.
State, 124 Neb. 485, 247 N.W. 21 (1933); State v. Satterfield, 198 N. C.
682, 153 S.E. 155 (1930).
2716Mclanahan v. State, 20 Ala. App. 533, 103 So. 717 (1925);
State v. Cope, 204 N. C. 28, 167 S.E. 456 (1932).
277 State v. Kellison, 233 Iowa 1274, 11 N.W. 2d 371 (1943); State
v. Sisneros, 42 N. M. 500, 82 P. 2d 274 (1938).
278 Smith v. State, ... Miss. ... , 20 So. 2d 701 (1945).
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manslaughter as homicide committed by one "while commit-
ting an unlawful act," or "in the pursuit of an unlawful de-
sign."279 To understand the true meaning of such a phrase it
is necessary to do more than add by interpretation that it means
unlawful in the sense of malum in se. For conviction of man-
slaughter in such a case the state must do more than establish
mere coincidence between such an act and the fact of death.280
It must establish the "causal connection" between the violation
and the loss of life.281 An excellent illustration is provided by
an Illinois case.2 82 A policeman committed a breach of duty
by failing to arrest certain gamblers and drunken persons. At
the time he was violating his duty in this respect, he acciden-
tally shot and killed a girl. He was convicted of manslaughter
on the ground that he caused the death while committing an
unlawful act. This was reversed because of the absence of any
causal connection between the unlawful act and the death. His
wilful breach of official duty was an offense malum in se; but
it had no connection, other than coincidence, with the acci-
dental homicide.
Statutes defining manslaughter (in part) in terms of a kill-
ing "in the commission of an unlawful act"2ss or "any of-
fense" 284 or a "misdemeanor 28 5 ordinarily receive the same in-
terpretation.286 Even under such legislation "the commission
of a misdemeanor in no way connected with the death is not
what is meant by the law. '2 7
The discussion of statutory charges, found under the head
of "malice aforethought," need not be repeated here; but a
summary can be offered in the light of that discussion. The
unlawful act relied upon to make the resulting loss of life man-
slaughter must not be too serious a crime, for that would bring
the homicide within the category of murder. At common law
this means the "other offense" should be less than a "dangerous
felony." Statutes have sometimes moved this boundary line
one way or the other. A number of them make the dividing
line between murder and manslaughter, in this area, the line
between felony and misdemeanor. Some have moved it in the
other direction by specifying the boundary line not in terms
of any dangerous felony, but only of arson, burglary, rape, rob-
bery or mayhem. And in the rare instances in which murder
279 Smith V. State, 33 Me. 48, 55 (1851).28 0Kimml v. State, 198 Ind. 444, 154 N.E. 16 (1926); Maxon v.
State, 177 Wis. 379, 187 N.W. 753 (1922).
281 Thompson v. State, 108 Fla. 370, 146 So. 201 (1933).
282People v. Mulcahy, 318 Ill. 332, 149 N.E. 266 (1925).
283 Colo. Stats. Ann. (1935) c. 48, sec. 36; Ga. Code (1933) sec.
26-1009; Ill. Crim. Code (Smith-Hurd, 1934) c. 38, sec. 363.
284 N. H. Rev. Laws (1942) c. 455, sec. 8.
285N. D. Rev. Code (1943)'sec. 12-2717.
286 State v. Schaeffer, 96 Ohio St. 215, 117 N.E. 220 (1917),
287Logan v. State, 42 Okla. Cr. R. 294, 298, 245 Pac. 657 (1929).
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is limited to intentional homicide any unintentional killing re-
sulting from an offense malum in se becomes manslaughter.
Homicide by Criminal Negligence. Negligence is any con-
duct, except conduct intentionally or wantonly disregardful of
an interest of others, which falls below the standard established
by law for the protection of others against unreasonable risk of
harm.28 8 The standard of conduct to which all except children
and insane persons must conform to avoid being negligent is
that of a reasonable man under like circumstances. 28 9 And who-
ever causes harm to another as a result of negligence thereby
incurs liability, - but not necessarily criminal guilt. The Mis-
souri court stated a well established principle in the following
words: "There is a marked distinction between simple or ordi-
nary negligence, giving one a right of action for damages, and
culpable negligence, rendering one guilty of a criminal of-
fense.- 29 0  It is "uniformly held," said the Florida court with
reference to this distinction, that the kind of negligence re-
quired to impose criminal responsibility "must be of a higher
degree than that required to establish simple negligence upon
a mere civil issue."'291
The English authorities have long recognized the possibility
of manslaughter being established upon a negligence basis. 292
And in the absence of some peculiarity in the statutory law,293
this is uniformly recognized in the United States. On the other
hand, also assuming the absence of unusual statutory provi-
sions, 29 4 it is possible to have negligence resulting in death with-
out any crime being committed. 295 To establish guilt of man-
slaughter on this basis it is necessary to prove that the death
was caused, not by ordinary negligence, but by negligent con-
288 See American Law Institute Restatement of the Law of Torts,
St. Paul, American Law Institute Publishers, 1934, sec. 282. The defini-
tion used here follows closely the definition used in the Restatement of
Torts. The word "wantonly" is substituted for "recklessly," because
wantonness tends to make the act malicious within the usage of the
criminal law; whereas recklessness is a factor in criminal negligence.
289 Id. at sec. 283.
290 State v. Baublits, 324 Mo. 1199, 1211, 27 S.W. 2d 16 (1930).
291 Cannon v. State, 91 Fla. 214, 222, 107 So. 360 (1926). See also
State v. Blaine, 104 N. J. L. 325, 328, 137 Atl. 829 (1927).292 Blackstone speaks of unintentional homicides caused by lawful
acts "without due caution and circumspection." Blackstone, Sir Wil-
liam, Commentaries on the Law of England, Oxford, Clarendon Press,
1768, Book 4, p. 192.293 Common law offenses are not punishable as such in Ohio. Hence
under the Ohio statute of manslaughter which (at that time) provided
for the punishment of unintentional homicides only if committed in the
perpetration of an unlawful act, it was held impossible to establish man-
slaughter upon the basis of culpable negligence. Johnson v. State, 66
Ohio St. 59, 63 N.E. 607 (1902).
A better result was reached in Indiana by holding that "unlawful
act" as used in its statute includes reckless conduct. Minardo v. State,
204 Ind. 422, 183 N.E. 548 (1932).
294 See the discussion infra under "negligent homicide."
295 Regina v. Spencer, 10 Cox C. C. 526 (1867) ; State v. Clark, 196
Iowa 1134, 196 N.W. 82 (1923); State v. Studebaker, 334 Mo. 471, 66
S.W. 2d 887 (1933).
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duct falling so far below the standard of social acceptability as
to be characterized as "criminal, 296 "culpable 297 or "gross" 298
negligence. As this involves a field not subject to exact meas-
urement, what it amounts to as a practical matter in the homi-
cide cases is a caution to the jury not to convict of crime, where
other elements of culpability are lacking, except where the con-
duct causing the death represents a rather extreme case of neg-
ligence. And, in spite of an unfortunate lack of uniformity in
expressing the idea, there is a tendency to speak of the types of
behavior amounting to criminal negligence in terms of "reck-
less conduct" or "recklessness." 299
What has been said here, together with the points mentioned
in the consideration of malice aforethought, discloses four cate-
gories of unintentional killing, other than homicides resulting
from an offense malum in se. They are- killings resulting
from -
1. Conduct involving an unreasonable risk of death or great
bodily injury to others, this risk being extreme in degree
and being accompanied by an awareness of such risk to-
gether with a wanton and wilful disregard of conse-
quences;
2. Conduct involving an unreasonable risk of death or great
bodily injury to others, this risk being extreme in degree
but without the additional factor present in the first;
3. Conduct involving an unreasonable risk of death or great
bodily injury to others, this risk not being extreme in
degree;
4. Conduct not involving an unreasonable risk of death or
great bodily injury to others.
The first of these categories goes beyond negligence in any de-
gree and falls under the label malice aforethought; the second
involves reckless conduct and constitutes criminal negligence;
the third amounts to ordinary negligence; while the fourth
measures up to the required standard of social acceptabilty
and is free from any taint of negligence.
As a matter of common law a killing in category one is mur-
der; in category two is manslaughter; in categories three or four
is innocent homicide.
296 People v. Buzan, 351 Ill. 610, 616, 184 N.E. 890 (1923); State v.
Sisneros, 42 N. M. 500, 82 P. 2d 274 (1938).
297 State v. Cantrell, ... Minn. ... , 18 N.W. 2d 681 (1945); Sims
v. State, 149 Miss. 171, 186, 115 So. 217 (1927).
298 State v. Blaine, 104 N. J. L. 325, 328, 140 AtI. 566 (1928).
299 People v. Glasebrook, 320 Ill. 567, 151 N.E. 489 (1926); State v.
Tomlinson, 209 Iowa 555, 558, 228 N.W. 80 (1929); Goodman v. Com-
monwealth, 153 Va. 943, 952, 151 S.E. 168 (1930); Albert v. Common-
wealth, 181 Va. 894, 27 S.E. 2d 177 (1943).
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C: NEGLIGENT HOMICIDE
As a matter of the common law of crimes any killing below
the grade of manslaughter is innocent homicide. And for the
most part this has not been changed by modem statutes. Nu-
merous specific instances of negligent homicides may be found
scattered through the various criminal codes, such as death
caused by negligently operating a steamboat, railroad train, or
automobile; overloading a steamboat; allowing a steam boiler
to explode; using firearms; handling explosives; and allowing
vicious animals to be at large with knowledge of their propen-
sities. Others might be added such as the case of an intoxicated
physician administering to a patient. For the most part these
have been expressly declared to be manslaughter.300 They
would have been held to be manslaughter either under the
common law or under the more general provisions of the code
if the careless conduct amounted to criminal negligence; and
almost without exception these special provisions are so worded
or interpreted as to include this requirement. 01
Statutory Changes. If none of the statutory provisions went
beyond this, the subject could be handled by the addition of a
sentence or two under the head of involuntary manslaughter.
There are a few states, however, with legislative provisions for
the punishment of certain homicides below the grade of man-
slaughter. This additional crime is generally known as "neg-
ligent homicide." Michigan, the leader in this field, enacted
a negligent homicide statute in 1921, whereby a lesser penalty
than that specified for manslaughter was provided for "any
person who, by the operation of any vehicle at an immoderate
rate of speed or in a careless, reckless or negligent manner, but
not wilfully or wantonly, shall cause the death of another."30 2
The enactment added: "The crime of negligent homicide shall
be deemed to be included within every crime of manslaughter
charged to have been committed in the operation of any vehi-
cle, and in any case where a defendant is charged with man-
slaughter committed in the operation of any vehicle, if the jury
shall find the defendant not guilty of the crime of manslaugh-
300 See, for example, Ark. Dig. of Stats. (1937) sees. 2984, 2987,
2988, 2989, 2990; Minn. Stats. (Mason's, 1927) sees. 10,080, 10,081,
10,082, 10,083, 10,084, 10,085.
301 Professor Moreland concludes that only four states apply the
tort standard of care in criminal cases, and his discussion shows that
three of the four do so under statutory provisions for "negligent homi-
cide" rather than manslaughter. Oklahoma seems to require only the
lack of ordinary care and prudence to establish the "culpable negligence"
sufficient for second degree manslaughter under its statutes if death
results. But even the Oklahoma cases are not entirely free from doubt
on this point. Moreland, Roy, A Rationale of Criminal Negligence, Lex-
ington, Kentucky, The University of Kentucky Press, 1944, pp. 10-16.
302 Mich. Stats. Ann. (1935) see. 28.556.
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ter such jury may in its discretion render a verdict of guilty of
negligent homicide."303
"By the enactment of this statute," said the court, "the Leg-
islature obviously intended to create a lesser offense than in-
voluntary manslaughter .... where the negligent killing was
caused by the operation of a vehicle... Therefore this statute
was intended to apply only to cases where the negligence is of
a lesser degree than gross negligence."304 The California court
has reached a similar result under its statute.305 In such a state
one who has caused death on the highway by his negligent
driving is guilty of manslaughter if his conduct amounted to
criminal negligence, and guilty of this special statutory offense
of negligent homicide if his conduct amounted to ordinary
negligence. Needless to say, even in such a jurisdiction the
death is innocent homicide if it results from driving not tainted
by negligence in any degree.
Not in all jurisdictions having this additional crime can
guilt of negligent homicide be established by mere proof of
ordinary negligence. In most of them, in fact, more is required
by the very language of the act itself.30 6 Back of all such stat-
utes seems to be the feeling of a need for a milder offense than
manslaughter due to the reluctance of juries to convict of that
offense in the fatal traffic accident cases.30 7 Hence for such a
killing these statutes provide a lesser penalty than for man-
slaughter, sometimes declaring it to be a "misdemeanor."308 A
number of them seem to occupy concurrently a portion of the
field of manslaughter merely to authorize the jury to apply the
milder labeP09 and lesser penalty if they so desire in these fatal
traffic cases.310 In Michigan, on the other hand, negligent homi-
cide is an "included offense" in the ordinary sense, as pre-
viously explained.
States having "negligent homicide" statutes are still in the
minority. Where such legislation is found it is usually re-
stricted to killings in some specified field, usually the field of
traffic accidents; but there are a few exceptions. One plan, as
logical as it is unusual, is to carve out of the crime of man-
3o3 Id. at sec. 28.557.
304People v. Campbell, 237 Mich. 424, 428, 212 N.W. 97, 99 (1927).
305 People v. Warner, 27 Cal. App. 2d 190, 80 P. 2d 737 (1938).
306 See, for example, La. Code of Crim. Law (Dart, 1943) sec. 740-
32 ("Criminal negligence"); N. H. Laws (1942) C. 118 sec. 12 ("reck-
less"); N. J. Rev. Stats. (1937) 2: 138-9 ("carelessly and heedlessly in
wilful or wanton disregard of the right of others"); N. Y. Pen. Law
(Gilbert, 1943) sec. 1053-a ("culpably negligent manner"); Wis. Stats.(1943) sec. 340, 271 ("constituting or amounting to a high degree of
negligence").307 Riesenfeld, Stefan A., Negligent Homicide, A Study in Statu-
tory Construction, 25 Calif. L. Rev. 1, 7-8, (1936).
308 N. J. Rev. Stats. (1937) sec. 2: 138-9.
309 New York merely calls it "criminal negligence in the operation
of a vehicle resulting in death." N. Y. Pen. Law. (Gilbert, 1943) sec.
1053-a.31 0 Riesenfeld, op. cit. supra f.n. 307.
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slaughter all of that part of the field in which guilt is grounded
upon a negligence basis, and to assign this to the new statutory
offense. The result is a three-fold division of criminal homi-
cide, as follows:
1. Murder - homicide with malice aforethought.
2. Manslaughter - just one offense although it may be:
a. voluntary - homicide in the sudden heat of passion
engendered by adequate provocation; or
b. involuntary - unintentional homicide resulting from
an unlawful act, malum in se, but not so grave as to
make the killing murder, or resulting from resistance
to lawful arrest by means not calculated to kill or
injure.
3. Negligent homicide - homicide which would be excus-
able except that it results from criminal negligence.
This is the Louisiana plan. n31
In Texas the legislature has made still a different re-group-
ing of the subdivisions of criminal homicide. The statutes
dealing with manslaughter were repealed, 312 and the subject
approached from a point of view supposed to be simplicity it-
self. The notion apparently was that any homicide, not justi-
fiable or excusable, should be murder if committed intention-
ally and negligent homicide if committed negligently. No
doubt the realization of a possible gap between these two led
to the use of the phrase "voluntarily kill," rather than "inten-
tionally kill" in the murder section.3 13 Not even the distinc-
tion between "voluntary" and "involuntary" was retained
without exception, because it was provided that a killing re-
sulting from a felony is murder and not negligent homicide.314
The next step was to retain the distinction between an unlaw-
ful killing with malice aforethought and an unlawful killing
in a sudden heat of passion engendered by adequate provoca-
tion. In this respect the change was in form only. The pen-
alty for murder under the Texas statute varies anywhere from
two years imprisonment to death.315 Murder is divided into
two kinds, - with malice aforethought and without.31 6 "Vol-
untary homicide committed without justification or excuse un-
der the immediate influence of a sudden passion arising from
an adequate cause" is made murder without malice and the
311 Louisiana has taken homicide by criminal negligence out of
manslaughter and labeled it "negligent homicide." So the subdivision
there is (1) murder, (2) manslaughter, and (3) negligent homicide.
La. Crim. Stats. Ann. (1943) arts. 740-29-740-32.
312 Acts of 1927, 40th Legis. p. 412, c. 274, sec. 3.
313 Tex. Stats. (Vernon, 1936) Pen. Code, art. 1256.
314Id. at art. 1241; Snyder v. State, 132 Tex. Cr. R. 73, 102 S.W.
2d 424 (1937).
315 Id. at art. 1257.
316 Id. at arts. 1257b, 1257c.
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punishment therefor cannot exceed imprisonment for five
years.3 17
The next step was to divide negligent homicide into two de-
grees,318 and contrary to common usage the first degree is a
lesser offense than the second.3 19 One who performs a lawful
act with such negligence as to cause the death of another is
guilty of negligent homicide of the first degree,3 20 while if the
act is unlawful the killing is negligent homicide of the second
degree.32' The phrase "unlawful act," as used for this pur-
pose, may be either a misdemeanor or an act giving rise to a
civil action but not a penal offense.322 Negligent homicide of
the second degree is then divided into two grades, in effect,
depending upon whether the "unlawful act" is or is not a mis-
demeanor.32 It is expressly provided that negligence is the
want of proper care and caution, 24 and this has been inter-
preted to require no more than ordinary negligence.325 The
ultimate result has been to divide criminal homicide into two
grades of murder, and two degrees of negligent homicide, of
which the second degree has two grades, - five subdivisions
in all.
2: SuICIDE
It is convenient to consider suicide at this point and, at
least in the light of the ancient law, it is not illogical to do so.
The word "suicide" is broad enough, in its literal sense, to
cover every case of self-killing. If limited to the self-killing of
a human being, without other restriction, it would seem to
include every instance in which such a one caused his own
death within the accepted rules of causation. If the word were
so used it might be common to divide suicide into three
classes - justifiable, excusable and culpable. If during a catas-
trophe, for example, two should find themselves in a situation
in which both could not survive and one should deliberately
abandon his position of momentary protection and plunge to
317Id. at arts. 1257b, 1257c.318 Id. at art. 1230.
319 Id. at arts. 1231-1243.320 Id. at art. 1231.
$21 Id. at art. 1239.
322Id. at art 1240.
s23 Id. at arts. 1242, 1243.
324Id. at art. 1233.
325 Young v. State, 120 Tex. Cr. R. 39, 41, 47 S.W. 2d 320, 321
(1932).
In affirming a conviction of negligent homicide, caused by a motor-
ist who attempted to -pass a school bus while it was discharging passen-
gers, which was a statutory misdemeanor, the court said:
"Negligence in the performance of an act, whether lawful or un-
lawful, is the gist of the offense of negligent homicide. When a person
in the performance of an unlawful act injures another, he is guilty of
negligence per se, that is, as a matter of law .... appellant was charged
with knowledge of the law which forbade him from passing the bus
while passengers were being received or discharged. He disobeyed the
penal statute. He could reasonably have anticipated injury to the
child." Menefee v. State, 129 Tex. Cr. R. 375, 87 S.W. (2d) 478 (1935).
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destruction for the better safety of the other, this heroic act of
self-sacrifice should be classed as justifiable rather than as cul-
pable or even merely excusable. Whereas, if one should cause
his own death unintentionally, while doing nothing unlawful
and without any culpable carelessness, his self-destruction
would merely be excusable. Actually however, we do not re-
fer to the one as "justifiable suicide" and the other as "excusa-
ble suicide," because Lord Hale used the word "suicide" as
synonymous with "'felo de se"3 26 and such seems to have been
the general usage ever since. 27
Suicide at Common Law. "Felt de se," or felon of himself is
freely spoken of by the early writers as self-murder.3 28  Hence
one who killed himself before he arrived at the age of discre-
tion or while he was non compos mentis, was not a felt de se, or
suicide.329 Saving for a moment the consideration of the pres-
ent law, it may be stated without hesitation that by the early
common law suicide was a felony and was punished by igno-
minious burial and forfeiture of goods and chattels to the
king.330 It was often spoken of as a voluntary act of intentional
self-destruction,33 1 but was not actually limited to this alone.
Thus if one by accident killed himself while attempting to
murder another, 32 or if a woman took poison with intent to
procure a miscarriage, and died as a result,33 3 the wrongdoer
in either case was felt de se.
It has been ably argued that suicide was murder by the Eng-
lish common law.33 4 But whether it is to be regarded as mur-
326 "Felt de se or suicide is, where a man of the age of discretion,
and compos mentis, voluntarily kills himself by stabbing, poison, or any
other way." Hale, Sir Matthew, The History of the Pleas of the Crown,
London, F. Gyles, 1736, vol. 1, p. 411.
327 "'Suicide'. .. is usually used to indicate the action of a person
who is able to weigh and appreciate the thing about to be done." Hepner
v. Department of Labor and Industries, 141 Wash. 55, 250 Pac. 461
(1926).
"Suicide is the intentional taking of one's own life." N. Y. Pen.
Law, (Gilbert, 1943) sec. 2300. "Although suicide is deemed a grave
public wrong, yet from the impossibility of reaching the successful per-
petrator, no forfeiture is imposed." Id. at sec. 2301.
328 "And first of the murder of a man's self, who is commonly called
felt de se." Coke, Sir Edward, Institutes of the Laws of England, Lon-
don, Lee and Pakeman, 1648, Third Part, p. 54. See also Blackstone,
Sir William, Commentaries on the Law of England, Oxford, Clarendon
Press, 1768, Book 4, p. 189.
329 bid.
330 ,,... by an ignominious burial in the highway, with a stake driv-
en through his body... [and] by a forfeiture of all his goods and chat-
tels to the king; hoping that his care for either his own reputation or
the welfare of his family would be some motive to restrain him from so
desperate and wicked an act." Blackstone, Sir William, op. cit. supra
f.n. 328, at p. 190.
331 "It must be simply voluntary, and with an intent to kill him-
self." Hale, Sir Matthew, op. cit. supra f.n. 326, at p. 412.
32 Id. at p. 413.
833 Rex v. Russell, 1 Moody, C. C. 356 (1832).
334 "It would seem then that whatever may have been the law be-
fore Bracton's time and, in whatever light he may have regarded.the
ordinary case of suicide, and notwithstanding the fact that most of the
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der, or as a separate but similar offense, there is no dispute
that suicide, as here explained, was a felony. Because of this
fact an attempt to commit suicide was a misdemeanor.3 5 One
who encouraged another to commit suicide was guilty of felony
as a principal if he was present at the act which caused the
death, and as an accessory before the fact if he was not present
when the fatal act was committed.836 For this reason, if two
mutually agreed to commit suicide, and the means employed
to produce death was effective only as to one, the survivor was
guilty of the murder of the one who died.337 Thus if two per-
sons encouraged each other to drown themselves, and both
plunged into the water by their mutual agreement and encour-
agement, whereupon one was drowned while the other was
saved, the survivor was guilty of the murder of the deceased. 338
Suicide Under Modern Statutes. The present law on the
subject of suicide has many points of conflict or uncertainty.
Ignominious burial and forfeiture of goods are no longer used
as penalties for crime and the present modes of punishment
are not adapted to reach one already dead. The problem is
emphasized by statutory definitions in terms of punishment.
If, for example, the statutory definition of felony is "any crime
punishable by death or imprisonment in the state prison," it
seems not to include suicide.339 One court has taken the posi-
tion that "suicide is none the less criminal because no punish-
ment can be inflicted," 340 and certain others have referred to it
as criminal . 4; Elsewhere, on the other hand, the suicide has
been held to be innocent of any crime,342 and this conclusion
seems unavoidable in those states which do not have common
law crimes and do not have any statute covering the case of
suicide.m
writers on criminal law have treated suicide topically separate from
murder, that suicide is murder in English law." Mikell, William E.,
"Is Suicide Murder?" 3 Col. L. Rev. 379, 391 (1903).
But in Regina. v. Burgess, Leigh & Cave 258 (1862), it was held
that an attempt to commit suicide was a misdemeanor but was not an
attempt to commit murder within the meaning of 24 and 25 Vict. c. 100.
335Regina v. Doody, 6 Cox, C. C. 463 (1854); Regina v. Burgess,
Leigh & Cave, 258 (1862).336 Rez v. Russell, 1 Moody, C. C. 356 (1832). When the mode of
punishment changed and there was no longer any penalty which could
be inflicted upon the suicide, the accessory escaped punishment also by
reason of the rule that an accessory could not be tried until after the
principal had been tried and convicted. Ibid; Regina v. Leddington, 9
Car. & P. 79 (1839).
337 Regina v. Allison, 8 Car. & P. 418 (1838).338ReX v. Dyson, Russ. & R. C. C. 523 (1823).
339 Commonwealth v. Mink, 123 Mass. 422, 429 (1878).340 State v. Carney, 69 N. J. L. 478, 480, 55 Atl. 44 (1903).
341 Suicide is "unlawful and criminal as malum in se." Common-
wealth v. Mink, 123 Mass. 422, 428 (1878).
Suicide in Alabama is a crime involving moral turpitude. Penn
Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Cobbs, 23 Ala. App. 205, 123 So. 94 (1929).
342 Grace v. State, 44 Tex. Cr. R. 193, 69 S.W. 529 (1902).
343 Since there are no crimes in Ohio unless declared to be so by
statute and since there is no statute dealing with suicide, it is no crime
in that state. Blackburn v. State, 23 Ohio St. 146 (1872).
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Whether suicide is a crime or not is far from a purely aca-
demic problem. While present penalties are inapplicable to
one who is dead, they can be used in the case of one who has
tried to kill himself and failed, in the case of one who has un-
intentionally killed someone else while attempting self-destruc-
tion, or in the case of one who has encouraged another to kill
himself or has actually assisted in the fatal act. As a matter of
common law all of these misdeeds are offenses if suicide is a
crime; but if suicide is not a crime it is arguable that no of-
fense is involved in any of them except where actual assistance
was given to the fatal act, - provided the killing of another
during attempted suicide was not under such circumstances as
to amount to malice aforethought or criminal negligence for
reasons quite apart from suicidal effort. If, for example, a man
should try to destroy himself with a bomb at a time and place
where others were in obvious danger, and should kill someone
else but not himself, he would clearly be guilty of manslaugh-
ter if not of murder. To put the matter in the most extreme
form: One who has maliciously caused the death of another is
not relieved from guilt of murder by the fact that he was try-
ing to take his own life also.
To inquire further into these problems, what about the man
who has attempted to take his own life without success and
without causing harm to any other? It was a misdemeanor at
common law, but is it under our modem codes? Under a stat-
ute providing that "all other offenses of an indictable nature
at common law, and not provided for in this or some other act
of the legislature, shall be misdemeanors, and be punished ac-
cordingly," it was held that an unsuccessful attempt to commit
suicide was punishable in New Jersey.s ' In Maine, on the
other hand, where attempts are made crimes by the statutes
only where the acts attempted are punishable, the attempt to
commit suicide was held not to be an offense.3 45
The cases are also not in accord as to the effect of an acci-
dental killing of another during an attempt to commit suicide.
This has been held to be at least manslaughter, and perhaps
murder, in Massachusetts, 346 murder in South Carolina,3 47 and
no crime at all, without additional facts, in Iowa.342
The decisions with reference to aiding and abetting in the
suicide of another are equally divergent.
"Whatever may have been the law in England or whatever
that law may be now with reference to suicides, and the pun-
ishment of persons connected with the suicide, by furnishing
344 State V. Carney, 69 N. J. L. 478, 55 AtI. 44 (1903).345 May v. Pennell, 101 Me. 516, 64 AtI. 885 (1906).
346 Commonwealth v. Mink, 123 Mass. 422 (1878).
347 State v. Levelle, 34 S.C. 120, 13 S.E. 319 (1890).
348 State v. Campbell, 217 Iowa 848, 251 N.W. 717 (1934).
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the means of other agencies, it does not obtain in Texas. So
far as the law is concerned, the suicide is innocent; therefore,
the party who furnishes the means to the suicide must also be
innocent of violating the law. We have no statute denouncing
suicidal acts; nor does our law denounce a punishment against
those who furnish a suicide with the means by which the sui-
cide takes his own life."3 49
The Ohio court takes quite a different stand.
"If the prisoner furnished the poison to the deceased for the
purpose and with the intent that she should with it commit
suicide, and she accordingly took and used it for that purpose;
or if he did not furnish the poison, but was present at the tak-
ing thereof by the deceased, participating, by persuasion, force,
threats, or otherwise, in the taking thereof, or the introduction
of it into her stomach or body; then, in either of the cases sup-
posed, he administered the poison to her, within the meaning
of the statute."3 50
And Illinois has held that one who aids and abets a suicide
is guilty of murder as a principal in the first degree.351
Actual assistance to the suicide may be carried too far for
innocence in any jurisdiction. Texas has gone very far in
holding that one who furnishes the means to the suicide is in-
nocent. But even in that state it was held that one who fur-
nished the poison to a suicide, knowing the intention of the
other, and at the suicide's request placed the poison in his
mouth, with fatal consequences, was guilty of murder. 52
The whole approach to the law of suicide seems to have been
unduly influenced by abstractions. Undoubtedly there is a
social interest in the life of the individual. Without question
one who wilfully takes his own life under circumstances to
bring him within the felo de se label has caused social harm
without justification or excuse. But when a man is in the act
of taking his own life there seems to be little advantage in
having the law say to him: "You will be punished if you
fail." 353  Almost invariably one who has made an unsuccessful
attempt to kill himself is in serious need of medical attention,-
which usually includes need of the psychiatrist as well as of the
surgeon or general practitioner. What is done to him will not
tend to deter others because those bent on self-destruction do
not expect to be unsuccessful. It is doubtful whether any-
thing is gained by treating such conduct as a crime. In rare
349 Grace v. State, 44 Tex. Cr. R. 193, 69 S.W. 529 (1902).35OBlackburn v. State, 23 Ohio St. 146 (1872).
351 Burnett v. People, 204 Ill. 208, 68 N.E. 505 (1903).
352 Aven v. State, 102 Tex. Cr. R. 478, 277 S.W. 1080 (1925).
353 Larrimore, Wilber, "Suicide and the Law," 17 Harv. L. Rev. 331
1904; Larrimore, Wilber, "Felo De Se," 47 Am. L. Rev. 210 (1913). See
also Withers, R. W. "Status of Suicide as a Crime," 19 Va. Law Reg.
641 (1914).
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instances it is expressly made punishable by statute,354 but in
one state, at least, a former statutory provision for punishment
of attempted suicide has been repealed.3 55
The method of dealing with one who has unintentionally
killed another in the attempt to take his own life is possibly
open to more question. Perhaps the best solution is to dis-
pose of this on the same basis as other accidents and excuse
the slayer if the circumstances did not involve such disregard
for the safety of others as to constitute at least criminal negli-
gence. Quite a different answer is required for the final point
in the criminal law of suicide although even this can be cloud-
ed in doubt if approached from the viewpoint of theoretical
abstractions. Thus, it is not a crime, generally speaking, to
induce another to do what can be accomplished by him with-
out criminal guilt, provided he has reached the age of discre-
tion and is in his right mind at the time. This seems to sug-
gest that wherever suicide itself is not a crime there can be no
offense in inducing another to end his life. This position is
assailable, even as an abstraction, because few generalizations
of the breadth of the one mentioned are entirely free from ex-
ception. Moreover, this position assumes that the average
suicide is sane at the time which, to state the matter mildly,
is something to be established by proof rather than to be taken
for granted by assumption.
On the other hand, if this point is approached as a problem
of social discipline rather than as a theoretical abstraction, the
solution is entirely free from doubt. This, let us hasten to
add, has nothing in common with euthenasia, or "mercy kill-
ing," a problem entirely beyond the scope of the present chap-
ter. If one man (or any group of men) is ever to be author-
ized to act upon his own (or their own) determination that the
time has come "to put another out of his misery" (which will
require the aid of legislation since no such authority is recog-
nized by common law, and as to which we studiously avoid
any opinion here), more adequate safeguards and more effi-
cient methods will be required than can be found in the de-
vice of attempting to persuade the sufferer to take his own life.
Actually, the "mercy killer" resorts to direct action, while the
one who has induced another to kill himself has been prompted
by baser motives. The latter type of conduct is anti-social in
the extreme and should be clearly branded as criminal. No
statute should be required to bring this within the field of
felonious homicide but a number of states have eliminated
any possibility of doubt by legislation declaring that induced
354 N. D. Rev. Code (1943) see. 12-3302; Wash. Rev. Stats. (Rem-
ington, 1931) sec. 2386.
355 New York, Laws 1919, C. 414, repealed sections 2302 and 2303
of the penal law.
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self-destruction is manslaughter356 or an offense under some
other name357 on the part of the inducer.
3: DEGREES OF CRIMINAL HOMICIDE
Subdivisions of Criminal Homicide. It is often said that
manslaughter is not a degree of the crime of murder, but a
distinct offense.358 This is beyond question since manslaugh-
ter is not murder; but it is commonly recognized as an "in-
cluded crime."3 59 While it is possible to find holdings to the
effect that a charge of murder will not support a conviction
of involuntary manslaughter, 6 0 the better view is that such a
charge includes all grades of felonious homicide and will sup-
port a conviction of manslaughter whether voluntary or in-
voluntary.361 In other words, while manslaughter is not a
degree of murder, the two are really different degrees of felon-
ious homicide,362 in the broad sense, although the statutes do
not make use of the word "degree" for this purpose. The Ne-
braska court has not hesitated to speak of first and second de-
gree murder and manslaughter as "degrees" of a single crime
of criminal homicide;8631 and this has ample support in the
historical development of the field.
What we now know as murder and manslaughter constituted
* just one offense under the common law of England.364 Prior
to ancient statutory changes any offense in this field was pun-
ishable by death and by forfeiture of lands and goods; and on
the other hand it was within the scope of benefit of clergy
whereby the life of the convict might be saved if he qualified.365
366 "Every person who in any manner shall wilfully advise, encour-
age, abet, or assist another in taking the latter's life shall be guilty of
manslaughter in the first degree." Minn. Stats. (Mason's, 1927). Sec.
10,062.
For similar provisions (usually without naming a degree of man-
slaughter) see the statutes in Nevada, New York and Washington.
"If any person shall purposely and deliberately procure another to
commit self-murder, or assist another in the commission thereof, such
person shall be deemed guilty of manslaughter." Oreg. Code (1930)
sec. 14-207.
357 "Felony," maximum punishment 10 years. Miss. Code (1942)
sec. 2375. "Advising and aiding suicide," punishment not less than 7
years. N. D. Rev. Code (1943) sec. 12-3303. For similar provisions
see the statutes of Oklahoma and South Dakota.
358.Folks v. State 85 Fla. 238, 247, 95 So. 619 (1923); State v.
Trent, 122 Oreg. 444, 252 Pac. 975, 259 Pac. 893 (1927).
359 State v. Johnson, 215 Iowa 483, 488, 245 N.W. 728 (1932).
360 Commonwealth v. Mayberry, 290 Pa. 195, 138 At,. 686 (1927).
361 People v. Mount, 93 Cal. App. 81, 269 Pac. 531 (1928) ; State v.
Baublits, 324 Mo. 1119, 27 S.W. 2d (1930); State v. Nortin, 170 Ore.
296, 133 P. 2d 252 (1943); State v. Quick, 168 S. C. 76, 167 S.E. 456(1932).362 Rhea v. Territory, 3 Okla. Cr. R. 230, 235, 105 Pac. 314 (1909).
363 State v. Hutter, ... , Neb., ... 18 N.W. 2d 303, 208 (1945).
364 Stephen, Sir James Fitzjames, History of the Criminal Law of
England, London, Macmillan Co., 1883, vo. 3, p. 44.
365 Ibid. Nominally only members of the clergy were entitled to
benefit of clergy; but the courts extended it to include every man who
could read, on the fiction that if he could read he must be a member of
the clergy.
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A series of statutes, during the period from 1496 to 1547, 66
excluded from benefit of clergy certain of the more serious
forms of felonious homicide, referring to them as murder com-
mitted with malice aforethought.367 The wording of such leg-
islation is quite significant. The killings which were to be
punished by death without benefit of clergy were not referred
to as homicide with malice aforethought, but as murder with
malice aforethought. This suggests a concept of murder with-
out malice aforethought, and in all probability the lawmakers
at that time would have divided the crime of murder into two
degrees, based upon this differentiation, had the idea occurred
to them. Apparently they not only did not think of this but
even overlooked the importance of giving any designation to
that part of the field of felonious homicide which they left
within benefit of clergy. At least they did not name it. The
courts might have resorted to the technique used in speaking
of larceny and made use of the phrases "grand murder" and
"petit murder" to distinguish the two grades of unlawful kill-
ing, - except for the obvious impropriety of referring to any
grade of murder as "petit." What they actually did was to
reserve the word "murder" for homicide with malice afore-
thought and invent a new term, "manslaughter," for the other
grade.
In some of the states in this country the statutes have made
no further subdivision, making provision for the handling of
specific cases by considerable latitude in the punishment pro-
vided for each of the two. In Illinois, for example, murder
may be punished by death, by imprisonment in the peniten-
tiary for life, or by a term of not less than fourteen years; while
the penalty for manslaughter is a term of from one to fourteen
years. 368 Such a plan is probably wiser than any legislative
effort to subdivide these offenses into degrees with less latitude
in the punishment for each degree; but the tendency in this
country has been in the direction of more subdivision. For
the most part this extension has been moderate. Most of the
states have provided two degrees of murder while leaving man-
slaughter without such division. Some of these, it must be
added, have in effect created two degrees of manslaughter,
without speaking in terms of degrees, by providing quite a dif-
ferent penalty for voluntary manslaughter than is specified for
involuntary manslaughter. In Utah, for example, voluntary
manslaughter is punished by a term of from one to ten years
36612 Hen. VII, c. 7 (1496); 4 Hen. VIII, c. 2 (1512); 23 Hen.
VIII, c. 1, sees. 3, 4 (1531) ; 1 Edw. VI, c. 12, see. 10 (1547).
367 The actual phrasing was (1) "wilful prepensed murders;" (2)
"murder upon malice prepensed;" (3) "wilful murder of malice pre-
pensed;" (4) "murder of malice prepensed." See statutes cited in the
preceding note.
368 Ill. Ann. Stats. (Smith-Hurd, 1935) c. 38, secs. 358-364.
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in the penitentiary, whereas the penalty for involuntary man-
slaughter is not to exceed one year in jail.36 9
Other states have made this additional subdivision in form
as well as in substance by providing for two degrees of murder
and two degrees of manslaughter, as is true in New Hamp-
shire,370 New York,371 North Dakota372 and Ohio. 73 Florida
reaches a four-fold division by establishing three degrees of
murder and leaving manslaughter undivided.37 4 A few states
have carried the process of division even farther. Thus Min-
nesota has three degrees of murder and two of manslaughter; 375
Kansas has two degrees of murder and four of manslaughter; 37
Wisconsin seems to hold the present "record" with three de-
grees of murder and four of manslaughter.317 It may be added
as a curiosity that New Mexico at one time had five degrees of
murder.378
Murder. Occasionally first degree murder is defined, in part,
in terms of "express malice aforethought, 379 although usually
some types of implied malice aforethought are included.3 0
Ordinarily the same result is achieved without the use of these
phrases in the definition. The following is a general pattern
which has been used in most of the states in the definition of
first degree murder:
"All murder which shall be perpetrated by means of poison,
or lying in wait, or any other kind of wilful, deliberate and
premeditated killing, or which shall be committed in the per-
petration, or attempt to perpetrate any arson, rape, robbery or
burglary, shall be murder in the first degree,... " 38 1
Statutes making use of this pattern sometimes have certain
369 Utah, Code (1943) see. 103-28-6. See also, N. C. Gen. Stats.
(1943) sec. 14-18.
370 N. H. Rev. Laws (1942) c. 455, secs. 1, 8, 9.
371 N. Y. Pen. Law (Gilbert, 1943) secs. 1044-1053.
372 N. D. Rev. Code (1943) secs. 12-2711, 12-2716.
373 Ohio Gen. Code (Page, 1940) secs. 12,399-12,404-1.
374 Fla. Stats. Ann. (1941) secs. 782.04, 782.07.
375 Minn. Stats. (Mason's, 1927) sees. 10,067-10,068.
376 Kansas Gen. Stats. (1935) secs. 21-401, 21-402, 21-407-21,423.3 77 Wis. Stats. (1943) secs, 340.02--340.27. For a discussion of the
four degrees of manslaughter see State v. Scherr, 243 Wis. 65, 9 N.W.
2d 117 (1943).
378 N. M. Comp. Laws (1884) sees. 687 et seq.
379 See, for example, Del. Rev. Code 1935 sec. 5157.
380 The Delaware Code includes murder committed "in perpetrating,
or attempting to perpetrate any crime punishable with death." The
Wisconsin statute does not use the phrase "express malice aforethought,"
but provides as follows: "Such killing, when perpetrated from premedi-
tated design to effect the death of the person killed or of any human
being, shall be murder in the first degiee...." Wis. Stats. (1943) see.
340.02. And see sees. 340.03-340.08.
381 Mich. Stats. Ann. (1935) sec. 28.548. The omitted portion deals
with the penalty. This formula, variously worded, and with or without
various additions, is found in the statutes of Alabama, Arizona, Arkan-
sas, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Idaho, Iowa, Kansas, Maryland,
Michigan, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, New Hampshire, New Jersey,
New Mexico, North Carolina, North Dakota, Pennsylvania, Rhode Is-
land, Tennessee, Utah, Vermont, Virginia and West Virginia.
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variations in the wording and frequently have important addi-
tions. The most common additions are found in the first part
or in the last part. To the clause "perpetrated by means of
poison" some of the statutes add "imprisonment, starving, tor-
ture,"382 or some one.or two of these three. To the list of fel-
onies in the last part there are various additions, including
"mayhem,''383 "sodomy, '38 4 "larceny,"385 "injury to person or
property by means of any explosive compound,"386 and some-
times the sweeping provision "or other felony."387  The addi-
tion of the word "purposely" in such a manner as to apply to
all parts of the section is not unknown,38 8 but is relatively
rare.
3 8 9
Some first degree murder statutes are drafted along entirely
different lines, 390 but as the statute quoted is in its general form
the rather common plan, it is entitled to special attention. The
form of the statute might seem to suggest four different kinds
of first degree murder, but it hardly requires a second glance
to appreciate that murder by "lying in wait" is only a specific
illustration of a "wilful, deliberate and premeditated" murder.
This leaves three distinct groups of homicides which are mur-
der in the first degree according to the provisions of this stat-
ute. It might be rephrased in this form:
(1) All murder which is perpetrated by means of poison is
murder in the first degree.
(2) All murder which is perpetrated by means of lying in
382 N. C. Gen. Stats. (1943) see. 14-17. Virginia adds "imprison-
ment, starving." New Hampshire adds 'starving, torture." "Torture"
is added in California, Colorado, Idaho, Montana, Nebraska, North Da-
kota. "Starving" is added in West Virginia.
383 Iowa Code (1939) sec. 12911. This is also found in Arizona,
California, Colorado, Idaho, Maryland, Missouri, Montana and North
Dakota.
384N. J. Rev. Stats. (1937) sec. 2.138-2. Also found in Maryland
and North Dakota.
385Ark. Dig. of Stats. (1937) sec. 2969.
386 Conn. Gen. Stats. (Rev. of 1930) sec. 6043.
387 Kan. Rev. Stats. (1935) sec. 21--401. This is also found in
North Carolina. New Mexico simplifies the statement by omitting the
names of any felonies and substituting "any felony." N. M. Stats.
(1941) sec. 41-2404.
388 See, for example, Ohio Code (Page, 1939) sec. 12400. Robbins
v. State, 8 Ohio St. 131 (1857). But see sec. 12401 in which murder
"by obstructing or injuring a railroad" is made first degree murder and
the word "maliciously" is used but "purposely" is not. See also sec.
12402.
389 Usually this word is not found in the statute at all; in a few
states it is added to the clause referring to murder by deliberate and
premeditated malice, but not to other parts of the statute. For example,
the Oregon statute reads: "If any person shall purposely and of delib-
erate and premeditated malice, or in the commission or attempt to com-
mit any rape... ." Ore. Comp. Laws (1940) sec. 3.23-401 (italics added).
It is not necessary to show a killing done purposely or with deliberate
and premeditated malice if it is committed in the perpetration of rape,
arson, robbery or burglary. State v. Dorland, 161 Ore. 403, 89 P. 2d
595 (1939).
39oSee, for example, Del. Rev. Code (1935) sec. 5157; N. Y. Pen.
Law (McKenney, 1944) sec. 1044; Wis. Stats. (1943) sec. 340.02.
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wait, or any other kind of wilful, deliberate and premeditated
killing is murder in the first degree.
(3) All murder which is committed in the perpetration of,
or in the attempt to perpetrate, any arson, rape, robbery, or
burglary, is murder in the first degree.
Such a statute, let it be emphasized, makes no attempt to
define murder. "It has no application until a murder has been
established."3 91  If the homicide meets the requirements of
murder in general, and is shown to have been committed in
any of these ways, then the statute applies and makes the kill-
ing murder in the first degree. If the death would not other-
wise be murder at all this statute does not make it first degree
murder, because it speaks of "all murder" so perpetrated -
not "all homicide. '392 .By such legislation "murder, as limited
by the common law, has been divided into two classes" but the
"boundaries between murder and manslaughter remain un-
changed." 393 This is peculiarly important in cases of death by
poison. Homicide, effected by means of poison, might be com-
mitted with malice aforethought or it might be committed
without malice aforethought but under circumstances amount-
ing to criminal negligence, or it might be committed without
either malice aforethought or such want of care as to be de-
nominated criminal negligence. In the latter event it would
be no crime at all, but homicide by misadventure. If the kill-
ing by poison was without malice aforethought but under cir-
cumstances amounting to criminal negligence, it is manslaugh-
ter at common law and hence does not come within the terms
of this statute at all - but remains manslaughter.394 All homi-
cide, however, which is committed with malice aforethought,
and by means of poison, is murder in the first degree under
this statute.3 95 The same is true, moreover, if the killing is by
some other means specified at this point of the particular stat-
ute, - such as "torture." 396
"Lying in wait," as the phrase is used in the homicide cases,
means "hiding in ambush or concealment." 397 It is not to be
391 People v. Austin, 221 Mich. 635, 192 N.W. 590 (1923).
392 State v. Shock, 68 Mo. 552, 559 (1878); Pharr v. State, 7 Tex.
Ct. App. 472, 477 (1879). The Alabama statute uses the word "homi-
cide" in .place of the word "murder." Ala. Code (1940), tit. 14, sec. 314.
This would produce atrocious results if it were literally applied in the
cases of death by poison.
393 State v. Johnson, 8 Iowa 525, 529, 74 Am. Dec. 321 (1859).
Statutes in some states have changed the boundaries between mur-
der and manslaughter. See Davis v. State, 110 Tex. Cr. R. 605, 607-8,
10 S.W. (2d) 116 (1928); State v. Cooley, 165 Wash. 638, 5 Pac. (2d)
1005 (1931).394 State v. Phinney, 13 Idaho 307, 313, 89 Pac. 634, 12 L.R.A.N.S.
935, 12 Ann. Cas. 1079 (1907); People v. Austin, 221 Mich. 635, 644,
192 N.W. 590 (1923).
395State v. Bertoch, 112 Iowa 195, 83 N.W. 967 (1900).
39G People v. Duggan, 61 Cal. App. 2d 379, 143 P. 2d 88 (1943).
397 State v. Tyler, 122 Iowa 125, 131, 97 N.W. 983 (1904).
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taken too literally. One may be "lying in wait" in this sense
while standing erect.38 The words refer, not to the position
of the body, but to the "purpose of taking the person attacked
unawares" and necessarily imply "malice, premeditation, delib-
eration, and the wilful intent. ' 99  As previously suggested,
this is merely a specific illustration of a wilful, deliberate and
premeditated murder, and it could be omitted from the stat-
ute without changing the substance of the provisions.
If murder is committed by means of poison,400 or while per-
petrating or attempting to perpetrate any of the felonies named
in the statute,401 it is first degree murder even in the absence
of an actual intent to kill. This actual intent is essential, how-
ever, to constitute a "wilful, deliberate and premeditated"
murder.40 2 Accordingly it has been held that one who unlaw-
fully chokes another with intent to cause great injury but not
to kill, is guilty of second degree murder if death unintention-
ally results.403 It is not essential, however, for the intent to
kill to be directed against the person whose life is actually de-
stroyed.
An additional requirement of this particular clause is that
this intent be formed by a mind free from undue excitement.
"Deliberation means that the act is done in a cool state of
blood."404  Insult by mere words, for example, is insufficient
to reduce a killing from murder to manslaughter; but it may
arouse the passion of the person insulted to such an extent that
if he kills the speaker intentionally under the sudden excite-
ment engendered by these words, the homicide will not be
deliberate and hence not murder in the first degree.40 5 Further-
more, while voluntary intoxication does not excuse crime,408
it is possible for one to be so excited by drink as to be incapa-
ble of deliberate action,407 and a homicide committed by one
in such a condition is not a "wilful, deliberate and premedi-
398 Ibid.
399 Ibid.
40oState v. Robinson, 126 Iowa 69, 101 N.W. 634 (1904).4 0
'Burton v. United States, 151 F. 2d 17 (C.C.A., D.C., 1945);
State v. Best, 44 Wyo. 383, 12 P. 2d 1110 (1932).
402 State v. Johnson, 211 Iowa 874, 879, 234 N.W. 263 (1931); State
v. Johnson, 215 Iowa 483, 245 N.W. 728 (1932); State v. Benson, 183
N. C. 795, 798, 111 S.E. 869 (1922); Commonwealth v. Robinson, 305
Pa. 302, 157 Atl. 689 (1931).
403 Commonwealth v. Marshall, 287 Pa. 512, 135 Atl. 301 (1926).
404 State v. Benson, 183 N. C. 795, 798, 111 S.E. 869 (1922); State
v. Bowser, 214 N. C. 249, 253, 199 S.E. 31 (1938).
405 Watson v. State, 82 Ala. 10, 12 So. 455 (1886) ; State v. Robinett,
312 Mo. 635, 279 S.W. 696 (1926); State v. Jackson, 344 Mo. 1055, 130
S.W. 2d 595 (1939).
406 Abbott v. Commonwealth, 234 Ky. 423, 28 S.W. (2d) 486 (1930);
Perry v. State, 116 Tex. Cr. A. 226, 33 S.W. (2d) 1072 (1930).
407 Hopt v. People, 104 U. S. 631, 26 L. Ed. 873 (1881); People v.
Burkhart, 211 Cal. 726, 297 Pac. 11 (1931); State -v. Johnson, 40 Conn.
136, 143-4 (1873) ; Aszman v. State, 123 Ind. 347, 24 N.E. 123, 8 L.R.A.
33 (1889); O'Grady v. State, 36 Neb. 320, 321-2, 54 N.W. 556 (1893);
Pigman v. State, 14 Ohio St. 555, 556 (1846). But see Commonwealth
v. Lehman, 309 Pa. 486, 164 Atl. 526 (1932).
THE LAW OF HOMICIDE
tated murder," unless the intent to kill was formed before the
mind was thus affected.40 8
Even more is required by a proper interpretation of this
clause of the statute, although this element has been over-
looked at times. "Premeditation means 'thought of before-
hand' for some length of time, however short."409  One who
has in mind how completely the element of time disappeared
from the concept of malice aforethought need not be too sur-
prised at the treatment sometimes accorded the word "premed-
itated." Those who first employed this word in this type of
first degree murder statute undoubtedly had in mind a mali-
cious scheme thought out well in advance of the fatal act itself.
And unless we are willing to ignore the plain meaning of words
we are forced to recognize that a fatal act might be intentional
and yet entirely too hasty to be deliberate and premeditated.
The notion that a fully formed intent is always deliberate and
premeditated, no matter how short the time between the first
thought of the matter and the execution of the plan, is prepos-
terous. And yet some of the courts have taken just such a posi-
tion. The leading case upon this point is Commonwealth v.
Drum,410 in which the Pennsylvania court said: "Therefore, if
an intention to kill exists, it is wilful; if this intention be ac-
companied by such circumstances as evidence a mind fully
conscious of its purpose and design, it is deliberate; and if suffi-
cient time be afforded to enable the mind fully to frame the
design to killr and to select the instrument, or frame the plan
to carry this design into execution, it is premeditated. The
law fixes upon no length of time as necessary to form the in-
tention to kill, but leaves the existence of a fully formed intent
as a fact to be determined by the jury, from all the facts and
circumstances in evidence." In line with this suggestion it has
been held that one may be guilty of murder in the first degree
although the intent to commit such homicide is "formed by
the accused immediately before the act is actually commit-
ted, 4 11 or "at the very moment the fatal shot was fired.14 12
Ariother court has said: "The act may follow the intent as rap-
idly as thought may pass through the mind, and if the intent
[to kill] be followed by an act which results in the taking of
human life with malice aforethought, it is murder in the first
degree." 413
408People v. Bartz, 342 Ill. 56, 173 N.E. 779 (1930). And see Peo-
ple v. Crumble, 286 N. Y. 24, 35 N.E. 2d 634 (1941); State v. Kelly, 216
N. C. 627, 6 S.E. 2d 533 (1939).
409State v. Benson, 183 N. C. 795, 798, 111 S.E. 869 (1922); State
v. Bowser, 214 N. C. 249, 253, 199 S.E. 31 (1938).
410 58 Pa. St. 9, 16 (1868).
411 Wooten v. State, 104 Fla. 597, 140 So. 474 (1932).
412State v. Hall, 54 Nev. 213, 13 Pac. (2d) 624 (1932).
41sPeople v. Weeks, 104 Cal. App. 708, 712, 286 Pac. 514 (1930).
See also Maestas v. People, 91 Colo. 36, 12 Pac. (2d) 227 (1932).
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The sound interpretation of such a statute is that a killing
is deliberate and premeditated if, and only if, it results from
real and substantial reflection. 414 It is not sufficient that the
idea be fully formed and acted upon; it must be pondered over
and weighed in the mind. It is true the law does not attempt
to set a period of time for this requirement in terms of hours,
or minutes or even seconds; but premeditation takes "some
appreciable time.' 415 It is not essential, however, for the delib-
eration and premeditation to take place after the intent is
formed; such careful consideration may precede the intent. If
one has pondered over the possibility of taking another's life
and has reflected upon this matter coolly and fully before a de-
cision is reached, he may truly be said to have killed "wilfully,
deliberately and premeditatedly," although after his intent was
fully formed he carried it into effect as rapidly as thought can
be translated into action. 41 6 But the same intent, suddenly
formed without preliminary consideration, and executed with
such speed, would result in action properly characterized as
hasty rather than deliberate and premeditated.
In other words, if the killing is not by poison (or some other
special means if specified by the particular statute, such as
"torture"), and is not committed by one who is perpetrating
or attempting to perpetrate one of the felonies enumerated in
the statute, there are three basic requirements for murder in
the first degree, in addition to the requirement that the homi-
cide must be murder within the rules of the common law. The
first of these is that the homicide be intentional; the second is
that the intent to kill must be formed by a mind that is cool
rather than one that is unreasonably inflamed or excited; and
the third is that the thought of taking the victim's life must
have been reflected upon for some appreciable length of time
414 Bostic v. United States, 94 F. 2d 636 (C.C.A., D.C., 1937); Peo-
ple v. Guadagnino, 333 N. Y. 344, 135 N.E. 594 (1922) ; State v. Clayton,
83 N.J.L. 673, 83 Atl. 173 (1912); State v. Arata, 56 Wash. 185, 125
Pac. 227 (1909).
In affirming a conviction of first degree murder the District Court
of Appeal, Second District, Division 3, California said: "It is not a
legal requirement that premeditation, sufficient to constitute the element
of premeditation in murder in the first degree, should exist for any
given length of time, or for an appreciable time.... Such premeditation
may be instantaneous." People v. Hashaway, Cal. App. ... , 155 P. 2d
101, 110 (1945).
The supreme court of California, in denying a petition for a hear-
ing of this case expressly withheld approval of the above statement.
People v. Hashaway, Cal. ... , 155 P. 2d 823 (1945).415 State v. Zdanowicz, 69 N.J.L. 619, 627, 55 Atl. 743, 746 (1903).
Some of the statutes define murder (in part) in terms of a premedi-
tated design to effect death. And where this word is used in the general
murder statute (as distinguished from first degree murder) it is some-
times expressly provided that such design may be formed instantly
before the killing. See, for example, N. D. Rev. Code (1943) secs. 12-
2708, 12-2709.
416 People v. Russo, 133 Cal. App. 468, 24 P. 2d 580 (1933).
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before it was carried into effect, although not necessarily after
the fatal decision was made.
The remaining type of homicide made murder in the first
degree by such a statute, is any murder committed in the per-
petration of, or in the attempt to perpetrate, any arson 4 17
rape41 8 robbery,4 19 or burglary.420  In discussing the general
subject of malice aforethought it was pointed out that homi-
cide resulting from the commission of a dangerous felony, such
as one of these, is murder at common law. Many cases there
cited were in fact first degree murder cases. It is not necessary
to repeat them here. This reference, however, suggests a mat-
ter entitled to attention. While homicide by poison might not
be first degree murder under the statute, because for example
it was the result of an innocent accident; and while a wilful,
deliberate and premeditated homicide might be justifiable, as
the act of the officer in executing the sentence of death; any
homicide resulting from one of these felonies is first degree
murder under the statute, because it is murder as a matter of
the common law regardless of the attending circumstances.
Such is the proper interpretation of the typical first degree
murder statute. In Missouri the language of the statute reaches
this result with peculiar precision:
417 Defendant set fire to a store he had leased, in order to defraud
the insurance company. Persons in an adjoining building were killed
in the fire. This was held to be murder even if there was no intent to
cause death. People v. Goldvarg, 346 Il. 398, 178 N.E. 892 (1931).
Glover committed arson by wilfully setting fire to a building. Glover
had no intent to harm any person, and left before the fire was actually
under way. Later an alarm was turned in by a passerby and one of the
firdmen was killed in the effort to extinguish the fire. Glover was held
guilty of murder in the first degree. State v. Glover, 330 Mo. 729, 50
S.W. 2d 1049 (1932).
418 Commonuealth v. Osman, 284 Mass. 421, 188 N.E. 226 (1934);
State v. Beale, 104 W. Va. 617, 141 S.E. 7, 401 (1927).
419State v. Rossi, 131 Conn. 39, 42 A. 2d 354 (1945); Swartz v.
State, 118 Neb. 591, 225 N.W. 766 (1929); State v. Compo, 108 N.J.L.
499, 158 Atl. 541 (1931); State v. Sterling, 200 N. C. 18, 156 S.E. 96
(1930); Commonwealth v. Crow, 303 Pa. 91, 154 Atl. 152 (1931);
McDonald 'v. State, 54 Okla. Cr. R. 161, 15 P. 2d 1092 (1932).
One who shoots and kills a policeman while the officer is attempting
to arrest him as he is actually engaged in the crime of robbery, is
guilty of murder in the first degree. Williams v. State, 183 Ark. 870,
39 S.W. 2d 295 (1931); Williams v. State, 186 Ark. 738, 55 S.W. 2d 928(1933).
One who has a pistol in his hand in furtherance of an attempt to
rob, and who causes death by the discharge of the pistol is guilty of
murder in the first degree, even though the discharge was not intended,
but was the result of accident. People v. Lytton, 257 N. Y. 310, 178
N.E. 290 (1931).
Several persons conspired to rob a store, arming themselves with
pistols and a sawed-off shotgun for this purpose. All but one entered
the store while that one was stationed outside with the shotgun. As
policemen approached, those who entered the store fled while the one
stationed on the outside shot and killed a policeman. Held all of the
conspirators are guilty of murder in the first degree. Woodruff v. State,
164 Tenn. 530, 51 S.W. 2d 843 (1932).
420 A burglar is guilty of murder in the first degree if his confed-
erate in the burglary shoots and kills a policeman during the perpetra-
tion of the crime. People v. Green, 217 Cal. 176, 17 Pat. 2d 730 (1932).
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"Every murder which shall be committed by means of poi-
son, or by lying in wait, or by any other kind of wilful, deliber-
ate and premeditated killing, and every homicide which shall
be committed in the perpetration or attempt to perpetrate any
arson, rape, robbery, burglary or mayhem, shall be deemed
murder in the first degree."421
In every case in which the prosecution seeks to establish guilt
of first degree murder on the ground that it was committed in
the perpetration of, or attempt to perpetrate, such a felony, the
guilt of this other felony or attempted felony must be clearly
shown. Thus if the charge is murder in the first degree on the
ground that it was committed by defendant while he was perpe-
trating a robbery, this degree of murder is not established if it
is shown that defendant was so intoxicated at the time that his
intellect was prostrated to such an extent as to be incapable
of forming an intent to steal. If he could not - and therefore
did not - have an intent to steal, he was not guilty of commit-
ting or attempting to commit robbery and hence does not come
under this clause of the statute.4 22
While the New York statute differs substantially from the
typical first degree murder act,428 one of the nicest cases on this
point is to be found in that state. Under the New York law a
child under sixteen who commits an act that would be a crime
not punishable by death or life imprisonment if committed by
an adult, is not guilty of a crime but of juvenile delinquency.42
Under this statute it was held that a boy of fifteen could not
be convicted of murder in the first degree on proof that he
killed a man while the boy was committing robbery, without
proof of a deliberate and premeditated killing. As the penalty
for murder in the first degree is death under the New York
statute,425 a boy under sixteen can be guilty of that crime. But
as the penalty for robbery is neither death nor life imprison-
ment,46 one under sixteen who does in New York what would
constitute robbery if done by an older person, is not guilty of
robbery, which is a felony, but of juvenile delinquency only.
Hence, as the homicide was not committed by one who was
"engaged in the commission of, or in an attempt to commit a
felony,"427 it is not first degree murder unless it can be shown
to come under the clause of "a deliberate and premeditated
421 Mo. Rev. Stats. (1939) see. 4376. Italics added.
422 People v. Koerber, 244 N. Y. 147, 155 N.E. 79 (1926).
423 "The killing of a human being, unless it is excusable or justifi-
able, is murder in the first degree when committed....
2.. .without a design to effect death, by a person engaged in the
commission of, or in an attempt to commit, a felony.... " N. Y. Pen.
Law (McKinney, 1944) see. 1044.
424Ibid. sec. 2186.
425 Ibid. see. 1045.
426Ibid. sec. 2125.427 1bid. sec. *1044.
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design to effect the death of the person killed, or of another. ' 428
Wrongs which do not constitute murder at common law are
sometimes included in the murder statutes, especially if a third
degree of murder is added.429 The more common plan, how-
ever, is to divide common law murder into two degrees, and
after setting forth in detail just what kinds of murder shall be
of the first degree, to add that all other murder shall be of the
second degree. 430  Under such statutes murder in the second
degree is common law murder without any of the aggravating
circumstances which are sufficient to raise it to the first de-
gree.4 3 1
Manslaughter. Conjecture might lead to the belief that in
the few states in which manslaughter is divided into degrees
the first degree will be assigned to voluntary manslaughter
while involuntary manslaughter is declared to be in the second
degree. This, however, is not the fact. Alabama started with
this plan432 but has since added a section providing for man-
slaughter in the first degree in one type of involuntary kill-
ing.433 New Hampshire places voluntary manslaughter and
certain aggravated types of involuntary manslaughter in the
first degree and all other manslaughter in the second.434 Ohio
places manslaughter in general in the first degree, and unlaw-
ful killing in violation of their traffic law in the second.435 It
happens that in several of the states using degrees of man-
slaughter, the statutory definition of murder has been enlarged
to include intentional killings amounting to voluntary man-
slaughter at common law. And the actual division is by de-
claring certain aggravated types of manslaughter to be of the
first degree436 and then either declaring all other manslaughter
428 People v. Roper, 259 N. Y. 170, 181 N.E. 88 (1932). See also
People v. Porter, 54 N. Y. S. 2d 3 (N. Y. Co. ct., 1945).
Several persons conspired to commit arson. During the carrying
out of the unlawful plan one of the conspirators was burned to death
by accident. It was held that the accidental death would not support
a conviction of murder of the first degree since the accidental death
was not in furtherance of the conspiracy, but utterly opposed to it.
People v. Ferlin, 203 Cal. 587, 257 Pac. 857 (1928). This, however,
seems to ignore the fact that the commission of one of the felonies speci-
fied in the statute (arson) caused the death.
429 See, for example, Minn. Stats. (Mason, 1927) sec. 10071. If
liquor sold unlawfully causes death when drunk the seller is guilty of
murder in the third degree.
430See, for example, Ariz. Code (1939) sec. 43-2902; Cal. Pen.
Code (Deering, 1941) sec. 189; Colo. Stats. Ann. (1936) v. 2, c. 48 sec.
32; Conn. Gen. Stats. (Rev. of 1930) sec. 6043; Del. Rev. Code (1935)
sec. 5158; Idaho Comp. Stats. (1932) sec. 17-1103; Iowa Code (1939)
sec. 12912; Mich. Comp. Laws (1929) sec. 16709.
431 Commonwealth v. McLaughlin, 293 Pa. 218, 221, 142 Atl. 213
(1928).
432Ala. Code (1940) tit. 14, sec. 320.
433 Id. at tit. 14, sec. 321.
4341N. H. Rev. Laws (1942) c. 455, secs. 8 and 9.
435 Ohio Gen. Code (Page, 1939) secs. 12404, 12404-1, 12550.
436 Minn. Stats. (Mason, 1927) secs. 10074-10076. See also the
statutes of New York, Oklahoma, South Dakota and Wisconsin.
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to be of the second degree, 4 7 or specifying the lesser types and
assigning them to the second8 s or lower degrees. 439 In Kan-
sas the division is on quite a different basis. First degree man-
slaughter includes killings that were not manslaughter at com-
mon law (including some types of common law murder) and
the rest of the field of manslaughter according to its statutory
provisions is divided among three other degrees.440
Negligent Homicide. In the few states having "negligent
homicide" as a separate offense this constitutes still a different
degree or grade of criminal homicide, particularly where it
does not require more than ordinary negligence, or where it is
used as a part of a legislative plan by which the crime of man-
slaughter is eliminated or narrowed in scope. As this statu-
tory offense was considered in another connection only this
reminder is needed here.
437Okia. Stats. (1941) tit. 21, sec. 716; S. D. (Comp. Laws, 1929)
secs. 4024, 4024A.
438 N. Y. Pen. Code (Gilbert, 1943) sec. 1052.
439 Wis. Stats. (1939), sec. 340-18 et seq.440 Kan. Gen. Stats. (1935) secs. 41--407 et seq.
